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INTRODUCTION 
mployees have enjoyed remarkable success in front of the 
Supreme Court on statutory retaliation claims in the past few 
years.1  At a time when the success rate of employment 
discrimination plaintiffs has been, at best, mixed, the Court has 
consistently interpreted statutory prohibitions on employer retaliation 
in a broad manner.2  Heading into its 2010 term, the Court had in 
nearly every case adopted an interpretation of a statutory 
antiretaliation provision that favors employees.3  With its decisions in 
Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP4 and Kasten v. Saint-
Gobain Performance Plastics Corp.,5 the Court kept the winning 
streak of retaliation plaintiffs intact. 
In Thompson, an employer was accused of retaliating against an 
individual who had filed a sex discrimination charge with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against the employer 
 
1 See Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court’s Antiretaliation Principle, 61 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 375, 375 (2011) (noting the success rate of plaintiffs in cases involving 
statutory retaliation claims). 
2 Id. 
3 Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 129 S. Ct. 846 (2009); 
CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442 (2008); Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 
474 (2008); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006); Jackson v. 
Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 
346 (1997).  The one exception to this trend was Clark County School District v. Breeden, 
532 U.S. 268 (2001) (per curiam).  In Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Court ruled against a public 
employee on his claim that his First Amendment rights had been violated when the 
employer allegedly retaliated against him on the basis of his speech.  547 U.S. 410, 426 
(2006). 
4 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011). 
5 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011). 
E
LONG 1/31/2012  1:39 PM 
2011] Employment Retaliation and the Accident of Text 527 
by firing the employee’s fiancé.6  The question facing the Court was 
whether Title VII provides a remedy to an employee who has not 
engaged in any type of protected activity but has nonetheless suffered 
harm at the hands of the employer based on the protected activity of 
another.  Reasoning that an employee who is fired as a result of an 
employer’s unlawful retaliation against another employee has been 
“aggrieved” within the meaning of Title VII, the Court held that the 
statute provides a remedy in such cases.7 
Kasten involved the meaning of the antiretaliation provision found 
in the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).  The plaintiff in Kasten had 
been fired after repeatedly raising concerns with his supervisor and 
others about a perceived violation of the FLSA wage and hour 
standards.8  The plaintiff alleged retaliation under § 215(a)(3) of the 
FLSA, which prohibits retaliation against an employee who has “filed 
any complaint.”9  All of the plaintiff’s complaints about the perceived 
violations were verbal in nature.  Thus, the question was whether the 
plaintiff had “filed” a complaint within the meaning of the Act.  The 
Court concluded that although the word “filed” could be interpreted to 
refer only to written complaints, the word was also expansive enough 
to include oral complaints.10 
At first glance at least, these decisions would seem to bode well for 
retaliation plaintiffs proceeding under other federal employment 
statutes.  The decisions obviously help future, similarly situated 
plaintiffs proceeding under the same statutes.  But the decisions might 
also assist similarly situated plaintiffs proceeding under other federal 
workplace statutes.  After all, courts frequently note their preference 
for interpreting statutes governing the workplace so as to produce 
consistency and uniformity.11  Thus, a favorable Title VII or FLSA 
retaliation decision from the Court might help a plaintiff alleging 
retaliation under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act12 
 
6 Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 867. 
7 Id. at 870. 
8 Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1330. 
9 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006). 
10 Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1336. 
11 See Darveau v. Detecon, Inc., 515 F.3d 334 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting the general 
practice of federal courts in interpreting other statutes consistently with Title VII); Phillips 
v. M.I. Quality Lawn Maint., Inc., No. 10-20698, 2010 WL 4237619, at *4 n.7 (S.D. Fla. 
Oct. 21, 2010) (“[C]ourts routinely examine FLSA retaliation claims under the same 
standards as Title VII retaliation claims.”). 
12 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 
29 U.S.C.). 
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(ERISA) or the Family and Medical Leave Act13 (FMLA).14  So, with 
plaintiffs winning once again in front of the Court, and with federal 
courts laboring to produce consistency, now hardly seems like the 
appropriate time to suggest that federal workplace retaliation law 
needs serious revision. 
I disagree.  I think the string of good luck that retaliation plaintiffs 
have enjoyed in front of the Court may be lulling proponents of robust 
protection from retaliation into a false sense of security.  Others have 
noted how lower courts sometimes take a narrow view of statutory 
antiretaliation provisions, even in the face of the Supreme Court’s 
ostensibly broad reading of the same language.15  The concern I 
identify in this Article is different.  My concern is that the text of 
many antiretaliation provisions, coupled with the Court’s textualist 
approach to interpretation, will leave courts with little choice but to 
adopt narrow constructions of other antiretaliation provisions in the 
future. 
The majority of the Court’s retaliation decisions so far have 
involved Title VII, the major player among federal employment 
statutes.  All of the other major federal employment statutes either 
contain explicit prohibitions on employer retaliation or have been 
held to prohibit employer retaliation.16  But there are also a host of 
other federal statutes—some well known, some relatively obscure—
that contain specific prohibitions on retaliation.17  There is certainly 
some superficial similarity between all of these statutes in terms of 
the language they use to address retaliation, and, in some instances, 
the language used is functionally identical.  A closer examination of 
the statutory language reveals, however, that there is remarkably little 
in the way of consistency of language among federal statutes 
 
13 Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2006)). 
14 See Duckworth v. Pratt & Whitney, Inc., 152 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1998) (stating in the 
context of an FMLA retaliation case that “[w]e regard Title VII, ADEA, ERISA, and 
FLSA as standing in pari passu and endorse the practice of treating judicial precedents 
interpreting one such statute as instructive in decisions involving another”) (internal 
quotations omitted); see also Phillips, 2010 WL 4237619, at *4 n.7 (“[C]ourts routinely 
examine FLSA retaliation claims under the same standards as Title VII retaliation 
claims.”). 
15 See Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a Rights-
Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 905 (2008) (criticizing the lower courts for their 
interpretation of the Court’s “material adversity” standard from Burlington Northern). 
16 See generally Lynn Ridgeway Zehrt, Retaliation’s Changing Landscape, 20 GEO. 
MASON U. C.R. L.J. 143, 161–64 (2010) (discussing different statutory approaches to 
retaliation). 
17 Id. at 162–63. 
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prohibiting workplace retaliation.18  The statutes employ a 
bewildering variety of language, with the differences in text ranging 
from the subtle (yet meaningful) to the dramatic.  Accordingly, it is 
exceedingly difficult to transfer interpretations and standards from 
one statute to another. 
As this Article attempts to illustrate, it is only a matter of time 
before employment retaliation plaintiffs who are similarly situated to 
plaintiffs who have won before the Court start losing.  Indeed, some 
of them are already losing in lower courts.  And, as this Article 
further attempts to illustrate, there is no good reason for the disparate 
treatment.  As the law currently exists, statutory retaliation plaintiffs 
win or lose largely due to the accident of statutory text rather than the 
fact that the law is operating as Congress envisioned or as part of a 
coherent scheme of regulation.  In short, the federal approach to 
workplace retaliation is inefficient, unnecessarily complex, and in 
need of major reform. 
To that end, Part I catalogs the Supreme Court’s decisions on 
employment retaliation and its relentless focus on statutory text.  Part 
II examines situations in which retaliation plaintiffs who are similarly 
situated to those who have prevailed previously before the Court are 
likely to eventually lose should the Court ever tackle the interpretive 
issues in question.  Part III discusses the unnecessary complexity and 
lack of a coherent rationale that underlies the federal approach to 
employment retaliation.  In order to address these problems, Part IV 
concludes by arguing in favor of a single antiretaliation provision that 
would apply to all federal statutes that prohibit retaliation in private, 
nonunion workforces. 
I 
WHY RETALIATION PLAINTIFFS HAVE WON SO FAR 
A.  The Fairness and Pragmatism Explanations 
There are any number of plausible explanations for the Court’s 
apparent sympathy for the victims of workplace retaliation.  One can 
be “pro-employer” and still be offended at the idea that an employer 
took action against an employee because the employee did something 
that the law allows or even encourages the employee to do.  Cases 
like Thompson, in which an employee is punished for the supposed 
 
18 See generally id. at 162 (“[T]here are significant differences in the language of the 
various retaliation provisions.”). 
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sins of another, tend to provoke a visceral response that cuts across 
ideological lines.19  Another explanation is that the Justices have 
recognized the obvious reality that if employers are free to retaliate 
against employees who have taken action that tends to further the 
substantive goals of a particular statute, the substantive goals of the 
statute are less likely to be attained.20  In the employment 
discrimination context, this means that giving employers a broad 
license to retaliate against employees who complain about or oppose 
discrimination would undermine the goal of eliminating 
discrimination in the workplace.21  Thus, perhaps the Justices’ 
pragmatic concerns over the effect of retaliation on the operation of 
statutes regulating the workplace are what drive the outcome of 
retaliation cases before the Court.22 
Surveying fifty years of Supreme Court retaliation jurisprudence, 
Professor Richard Moberly has concluded that the Court’s decisions 
are premised upon a belief that “employees must be protected from 
retaliation in order to further the enforcement of society’s civil and 
criminal laws.”23  According to Moberly, the principle that ties 
together the various retaliation decisions over the years is the Court’s 
view that antiretaliation protection serves “as a law-enforcement tool 
that benefits society” as a whole rather than simply the employees in 
question.24  Because the Court views antiretaliation provisions 
primarily as devices that further the ability of civil and criminal laws 
to operate effectively, Moberly argues, the Court has been willing to 
interpret the provisions broadly to further the societal interests.25 
These explanations certainly have a ring of truth to them and may, 
to a large extent, explain the outcome of many of the retaliation cases 
decided to date.  But fairness and pragmatic concerns will permit a 
judge to go only so far.  Ultimately, a judge’s discretion is bounded 
 
19 See David L. Hudson, Jr., Back at Ya, A.B.A. J., June 2011, at 21, 22 (noting that 
“retaliation claims lack politically potent wording”). 
20 See Matthew W. Green, Jr., Express Yourself: Striking a Balance Between Silence 
and Active, Purposive Opposition Under Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation Provision, 28 
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 107, 120 (2010) (noting the Court’s rejection that permitting 
retaliation undermines the statutory goal of eliminating discrimination). 
21 Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 129 S. Ct. 846, 852 
(2009). 
22 See Michael J. Zimmer, A Pro-Employee Supreme Court?: The Retaliation 
Decisions, 60 S.C. L. REV. 917, 918 (2009) (arguing that the Court’s retaliation decisions 
“are primarily a product of a pragmatic approach to judicial decision making”). 
23 Moberly, supra note 1, at 380. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 381. 
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by the text of whatever statute is at issue.26  For a textualist or 
formalist judge, the text is of primary concern and, in theory, fairness 
or pragmatic concerns are not enough to overcome the plain meaning 
of clear language.27  In contrast, a purposivist judge is primarily 
concerned with effectuating the legislative purpose underlying a 
statute when interpreting statutory language;28 however, even a 
purposivist judge concedes that the starting point of interpretation is 
the text of the statute.29 
Historically, courts were more willing to gloss over statutory 
language that seemed inconsistent with a clear legislative purpose or 
that, if interpreted literally, might produce undesirable effects.  When 
interpreting a remedial statute, courts would frequently rely upon the 
canon of construction calling for expansive interpretation of remedial 
statutes.30  This was as true of statutes regulating the workplace as it 
was of other types of statutes.31  But as Professor Michael Zimmer 
has noted, this canon has fallen out of favor in recent decades.32  In 
the ADA context, for example, some of the more purposivist-minded 
Justices on the Court could be found advancing this canon while 
dissenting from the majority’s hyperliteral interpretation of the 
ADA’s definition of disability in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. in 
1999.33 
The rise of the textualist approach to statutory interpretation during 
the 1980s and 1990s has had a dramatic impact on how judges 
interpret statutes.  Even the most devoted purposivist Justices on the 
Court now feel compelled to emphasize text at the expense of 
legislative purpose.34  Nowhere is the emphasis on text more apparent 
than in the Court’s interpretation of antiretaliation provisions. 
 
26 RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 13 (2008) (stating that a pragmatic 
judge’s discretion is restrained by “a due regard for the integrity of the written word in . . . 
statutes”). 
27 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 228 (2000). 
28 Id. at 221. 
29 John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2011 (2009). 
30 See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967). 
31 See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 13 (1980) (relying upon the canon in 
interpreting a workplace safety statute). 
32 Zimmer, supra note 22, at 949. 
33 527 U.S. 471, 504 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
34 See Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 
(2006) (“[T]extualism has so succeeded in discrediting strong purposivism that it has led 
even nonadherents to give great weight to statutory text.”). 
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B.  The Text-Based Explanation 
Judges unquestionably bring their own judicial philosophies and 
sensibilities to the task of statutory interpretation.  A judge who is 
most interested in effectuating the legislative purpose underlying a 
particular statute may find ambiguity in statutory text more often than 
a textualist.35  However, the ability of judges to stray from seemingly 
clear language is limited, particularly in the modern age of 
interpretive theory.  As the following Part illustrates, the interpretive 
issues the Court has faced thus far with respect to antiretaliation 
provisions have all involved situations in which the textual 
impediments to an expansive interpretation have posed, at most, weak 
obstacles to the ultimate interpretations provided by the Court. 
1.  Retaliation and Adverse Employment Actions 
In Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, the 
Supreme Court dealt with the scope of § 704(a), Title VII’s 
antiretaliation provision.  Specifically, the Court had to address 
“whether Title VII’s antiretaliation provision forbids only those 
employer actions and resulting harms that are related to employment 
or the workplace” or whether it also covers nonemployment-related 
actions.36  A circuit split existed at the time of the decision.  Some 
courts took a restrictive view of the provision, concluding that, to be 
actionable, the retaliation must “‘resul[t] in an adverse effect on the 
“terms, conditions, or benefits” of employment.’”37  Other courts took 
an even more restrictive view and adopted an “ultimate employment 
decisio[n] standard, which limits actionable retaliatory conduct to acts 
such as hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and 
compensating.”38 
Ultimately, the Court held unanimously that retaliation need not 
affect the terms, conditions, or benefits of employment to be 
actionable under Title VII.39  Instead, “a plaintiff must show that a 
 
35 See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 
1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 521 (noting the tendency of “strict constructionists” to find that the 
meaning of a statute is apparent from its text); Molot, supra note 34, at 46 (suggesting 
“that neither textualism nor purposivism is inherently more likely to find ambiguity or 
clarity in the law,” but noting that “some textualists have sought to equate textualism with 
just such a rush to clarity”). 
36 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 61 (2006). 
37 Id. at 60 (quoting Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 866 (4th Cir. 2001)). 
38 Id. (quoting Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
39 See id. at 68. 
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reasonable employee would have found the challenged action 
materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have 
dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of 
discrimination.”40  Thus, for example, an employer’s filing of false 
criminal charges against an employee in retaliation for the employee’s 
filing of a complaint of discrimination could be actionable.41 
In reaching this decision, the Court focused heavily on the textual 
differences between § 704(a) and § 703(a), Title VII’s 
antidiscrimination provision.42  Section 703(a), the antidiscrimination 
provision, makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire 
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against 
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment.”43  In contrast, § 704(a), Title VII’s 
antiretaliation provision, contains no reference to hiring, firing, or the 
“compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.”  
Instead, the provision simply provides that it is unlawful for an 
employer to “discriminate” against an employee for engaging in 
protected activity without qualifying the word “discriminate” in any 
manner.44  Thus, the logical implication, according to the Court, was 
that Congress intended for the two provisions to carry different 
meanings.45 
After dismissing any text-based objections to a broader reading of 
the statutory text, the Court explained why, as a matter of policy, the 
broader reading made more sense.46  The Court explained that the 
inclusion of the antiretaliation provision in Title VII was necessary to 
effectuate the statute’s overarching goal of eliminating discrimination 
in the workplace.47  Without an antiretaliation provision, the 
antidiscrimination provision could not operate because employees 
would be hesitant to assert their rights.48  From this premise, the 
Court quite correctly observed that employer retaliation need not 
necessarily involve employment-related actions to be effective in 
 
40 Id. (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
41 See id. at 64 (citing Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 984, 986 (10th Cir. 
1996)). 
42 Id. at 61–62. 
43 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
44 Id. 
45 Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 63. 
46 Id. at 65–66. 
47 Id. at 63–64. 
48 See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text. 
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discouraging employee participation in the process of rooting out 
discrimination.49  Nonemployment-related forms of retaliation can be 
just as effective in silencing employees.  So, because the statutory text 
could easily be construed in a manner consistent with these goals, the 
Court so construed it. 
To be clear, the Court’s material adversity standard was not 
required by the text of the statute.  A broader or narrower construction 
might have been permissible.50  But before Justice Breyer—perhaps 
the leading proponent of a more purposivist-oriented approach to 
interpretation51—could pick and choose from the range of permissible 
constructions, he first had to contend with the textual obstacles to 
those constructions.  And, in this instance, the text presented little in 
the way of obstacle and strongly suggested a more expansive 
interpretation of § 704(a) of the sort the Court ultimately adopted. 
2.  Internal Complaints and Other Forms of Opposition Conduct 
a.  Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp. 
Justice Breyer, again writing for the Court, took a similar approach 
in the Kasten decision from 2011.  As mentioned above, the Kasten 
Court, in a six-to-two decision,52 held that the FLSA affords 
protection from retaliation to an employee who makes an oral 
complaint of a violation of the Act.  In reaching this decision, the 
Court explained why it would make more sense, from a policy 
perspective, to interpret the statute in this manner rather than limit 
coverage to the filing of written complaints.  The Court reasoned that 
restricting application of § 215(a)(3) to the filing of written 
complaints would reduce the effectiveness of the Act in 
accomplishing one of its main goals: deterring unhealthy working 
conditions.53  A requirement that complaints must be in writing 
before an employee can be protected would limit the ability of 
illiterate, uneducated, or overworked employees to take advantage of 
the Act’s complaint procedure.54  The Court also suggested that a 
written-complaint requirement would impede the government’s 
ability to receive complaints through the use of hotlines and other oral 
 
49 Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 63–64. 
50 See Zimmer, supra note 22, at 927. 
51 Mark Tushnet, Heller and the Critique of Judgment, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 61, 77 n.57. 
52 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1328–29 (2011).  Justice Kagan did not participate.   
53 Id. at 1333. 
54 Id. 
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methods of gathering information.55  Finally, the Court noted that a 
written-complaint requirement “would discourage the use of desirable 
informal workplace grievance procedures.”56 
But before the Court allowed itself to expound on the benefits of a 
construction favoring protection of the filing of oral complaints, it 
first had to satisfy itself and readers that such a construction was 
permissible.  Thus, the Court devoted considerable time to explaining 
why the language at issue was subject to competing interpretations.  
To do this, Justice Breyer provided three different dictionary 
definitions of the word “file,” multiple examples from state statutes, 
examples from federal regulations, examples from state and federal 
judicial opinions, other usages of the term within the FLSA itself, and 
other usages of the term in other federal statutes containing 
antiretaliation provisions.57  Only after exhausting these varied 
sources and establishing that the term “file” could plausibly have 
different meanings did the Court look to the “functional 
considerations” supporting its ultimate construction of the Act.58 
Justice Breyer’s opinion drew a dissent from Justice Scalia, who 
was joined by Justice Thomas.  According to Justice Scalia, Justice 
Breyer’s reading of 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) impermissibly divorced the 
“filed any complaint” language from the rest of the language in the 
section.59  In full, § 215(a)(3) provides that it is unlawful for an 
employer 
to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any 
employee because such employee has filed any complaint or 
instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related 
to [the Act], or has testified or is about to testify in any such 
proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an industry 
committee.60 
Justice Scalia noted that “the phrase ‘filed any complaint’ appears 
alongside three other protected activities: ‘institut[ing] or caus[ing] to 
be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter,’ 
‘testif[ying] in any such proceeding,’ and ‘serv[ing] . . . on an 
industry committee.’”61  As each of these activities “involves an 
 
55 Id. at 1334. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 1331–33. 
58 Id. at 1333. 
59 See id. at 1337 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s interpretation). 
60 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006). 
61 Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1338 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
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interaction with governmental authority,” the phrase “filed any 
complaint” should be similarly construed to require interaction with 
governmental authority.62  Thus, in Justice Scalia’s view, it is only 
when an employee files a complaint with a judicial or administrative 
authority that § 215(a)(3) protects the employee.63 
Justice Scalia’s reading of the statutory language is certainly a 
permissible one.  However, in light of the fact that the phrase “filed 
any complaint” is removed from the other activities listed in               
§ 215(a)(3) and the fact that § 215(a)(3) as a whole is hardly a model 
of grammatical clarity,64 his is not the only reading of the language.  
Therefore, because the text provided only a weak obstacle to Justice 
Breyer’s reading of the statute, a majority of Justices perhaps felt 
comfortable enough to adopt the construction that best complied with 
their own views as to the proper role of antiretaliation provisions. 
b.  Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson 
County 
The Court’s interpretive method in Kasten was somewhat similar 
to its earlier approach in Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of 
Nashville & Davidson County.65  In Crawford, an employee alleged 
that her employer retaliated against her after she provided information 
about prior instances of harassment involving a supervisor as part of 
the employer’s internal investigation into another employee’s similar 
allegations against the supervisor.66  In response to the employer’s 
questions, the employee gave “an ostensibly disapproving account” of 
the supervisor’s past behavior.67  The question, then, was whether the 
employee’s actions amounted to protected activity. 
Title VII’s antiretaliation provision, § 704(a), provides protection 
for two types of plaintiffs: those who have opposed unlawful conduct 
and those who have “made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated 
in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this 
 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 1337.  Technically, the Court did not rule on the question of whether § 
215(a)(3) protects the filing of intracompany complaints, citing the employer’s failure to 
raise the argument in response to Kasten’s petition for certiorari.  Id. at 1336.  However, as 
Justice Scalia noted in his dissent, the Court seemed to assume that such complaints could 
be protected.  Id. at 1341. 
64 Congress’s strange use of commas—or lack thereof—in § 215(a)(3) makes the 
provision particularly difficult to comprehend. 
65 129 S. Ct. 846 (2009). 
66 Id. at 849. 
67 Id. at 850. 
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subchapter.”68  In concluding that the employee’s actions were 
protected, the Court could have held that voluntary participation in an 
employer’s internal investigation is protected under the second clause 
of § 704(a), the so-called “participation” clause.  However, the text of 
§ 704(a) presented the Court with a significant hurdle in that respect.  
Virtually every federal court has concluded that filing an internal 
complaint or participating in an employer’s internal investigation is 
not protected under Title VII’s participation clause.69  These courts 
have pointed out that, under the language of § 704(a), the 
“investigation, proceeding, or hearing” in which an employee 
participates must be one that arises “under this subchapter.”  The 
participation clause, in the view of these courts, is therefore designed 
to protect an employee who has participated in the “machinery 
available to seek redress for civil rights violations,” not those who 
have participated in internal investigations.70 
Faced with this textual hurdle in Crawford, Justice Souter, writing 
for a unanimous Court, instead chose to categorize the employee’s act 
of providing information as part of an internal investigation as 
“opposition” conduct and expressly declined to consider whether the 
conduct might also be classified as “participation” conduct.71  Justice 
Souter first looked to dictionary definitions of the term “oppose.”72  
He was then able to conclude fairly quickly that the Crawford 
plaintiff’s act of providing “an ostensibly disapproving account” of 
the supervisor’s past behavior amounted to “opposition,” even if she 
provided the information in response to a question rather than 
volunteering it.73 
3.  Third-Party Retaliation 
Thompson provides another recent example of the Court’s focus on 
text in the retaliation context.  As discussed above, Thompson 
involved a case of third-party retaliation under Title VII.  There was 
 
68 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006). 
69 Alex B. Long, The Troublemaker’s Friend: Retaliation Against Third Parties and the 
Right of Association in the Workplace, 59 FLA. L. REV. 931, 953–54 (2007) (“Federal 
courts uniformly have held that resort to an employer’s internal procedures for handling 
discrimination does not fall under the participation clause for purposes of a retaliation 
claim, at least prior to the filing of an EEOC charge, because such conduct does not relate 
to an investigation, proceeding, or hearing authorized by Title VII.”). 
70 Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1313 (6th Cir. 1989). 
71 Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 853. 
72 Id. at 850. 
73 Id.; accord id. at 852. 
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little dispute in the years following Burlington Northern that it was 
unlawful for an employer to take action against one employee in 
retaliation of another employee’s protected activity under Title VII.74  
The question was whether the actual victim of this type of third-party 
retaliation had a remedy in such cases.  In Thompson, the Court had 
two options from which to choose in concluding that a victim of third-
party retaliation has a remedy under Title VII.  The first approach was 
to use § 706, Title VII’s remedies section, as the statutory hook.  
Section 706(f)(1) provides that any person aggrieved by unlawful 
employer conduct can file a complaint.  As discharging one employee 
in retaliation for another employee’s protected activity is unlawful, 
the argument goes, the first employee is aggrieved by the employer’s 
unlawful conduct and is entitled to a remedy. 
The second approach was to interpret § 704(a), Title VII’s 
antiretaliation provision, to provide a remedy to the victim of third-
party retaliation.  This option would have provided the most direct 
solution to the problem of third-party retaliation.  However, it was 
also a solution that presented the Court with a potentially significant 
textual hurdle.  Section 704(a) provides that it is unlawful for an 
employer to retaliate against an individual “because he has opposed 
any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this 
subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or 
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing 
under this subchapter.”75  Read literally, the statute requires that the 
person who is retaliated against also be the person who engaged in the 
protected activity.  This is how the majority of federal courts 
interpreted the language prior to Thompson.76 
A few federal courts had been willing prior to Thompson to read 
the statutory language in a manner consistent with the obvious 
purpose of the statute so as to prevent employers from deterring 
employees from taking protected activity for fear that a friend or 
loved one might suffer.77  Importantly, the EEOC had long taken the 
position that the retaliation in such cases could be challenged by 
 
74 See  Freeman v. Barnhart, No. C 06-04900 JSW, 2008 WL 744827, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 18, 2008); Mutts v. S. Conn. State Univ., No. 3:04 CV 1746(MRK), 2006 WL 
1806179, at *11 (D. Conn. June 28, 2006). 
75 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
76 Long, supra note 69, at 934. 
77 See, e.g., Gonzalez v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 122 F. Supp. 2d 335, 347 
(N.D.N.Y. 2000); EEOC v. Nalbandian Sales, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1210 (E.D. Cal. 
1998). 
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either the party who engaged in the protected activity or the party who 
suffered the adverse action.78  Thus, the Court could have also relied 
on principles of agency deference in support of a broad construction 
of § 704(a).  However, in order to construe the language in this 
manner, the Court would have had to give short shrift to the actual 
text and rely heavily on a combination of policy-based arguments, 
agency deference, and absurdity arguments.79 
Not surprisingly, the Court, in a unanimous, eight-Justice decision 
authored by Justice Scalia, chose the path of least resistance offered 
by § 706.80  The only obstacle to concluding that the victim of third-
party retaliation is a “person aggrieved” within the meaning of Title 
VII was the possibility that the term could be construed to mean 
anyone with Article III standing, a result Justice Scalia deemed to be 
extreme and too expansive.81  There was decisional law from the 
Court in another context suggesting such an interpretation.82  
However, this precedent posed only a minor obstacle to a more 
narrow interpretation of the “person aggrieved” language insofar as 
the Court was able to characterize the decision as dicta (and dicta that 
was “ill-considered” at that).83  Thus, the text of § 706 and relevant 
decisional law provided little obstacle to the Court’s ultimate 
conclusion. 
4.  Other Examples of the Court’s Textualist Approach 
In the other recent cases involving construction of statutory 
antiretaliation provisions, the Court has repeatedly stressed the idea 
that its broad interpretations have been grounded in the text or at least 
are permissible under the text.  In Jackson v. Birmingham Board of 
Education,84 the Court held that Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 197285 prohibits recipients of federal education 
funding from retaliating against an individual who complains about 
unlawful sex discrimination, despite the absence of any express 
 
78 Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 871 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring) (quoting the EEOC compliance manual). 
79 See Nalbandian Sales, 36 F. Supp. at 1212 (advancing an absurdity argument in 
support). 
80 Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 870.  Justice Kagan did not participate. 
81 Id. at 869. 
82 Id. (citing Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972)). 
83 Id. at 869–70. 
84 544 U.S. 167 (2005). 
85 Pub. L. No. 92–318, 86 Stat. 373 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1681–1688 
(2006)). 
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statutory prohibition on retaliation.86  Relying upon Title IX’s 
prohibition on sex discrimination, the Court neatly concluded that 
“[r]etaliation against a person because that person has complained of 
sex discrimination is another form of intentional sex discrimination 
encompassed by Title IX’s private cause of action.”87  Thus, when a 
defendant retaliates against an individual because the individual 
complained of sex discrimination, the defendant has discriminated on 
the basis of sex in violation of Title IX.88 
The Court conceivably could have relied upon a Department of 
Education regulation that prohibited retaliation in this context.  Yet 
the Court expressly disavowed any reliance on the regulations, 
stating, “[W]e do not rely on the Department of Education’s 
regulation at all, because the statute itself contains the necessary 
prohibition.”89  The Court’s conclusion drew a stinging response from 
Justice Thomas, who was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justices Scalia and Kennedy.90  Thomas and Scalia again dissented in 
two subsequent cases, Gomez-Perez v. Potter and CBOCS West, Inc. 
v. Humphries, when the Court employed a similar analytical approach 
in concluding that § 1981 and the federal-sector provision of the 
ADEA prohibit retaliation despite the absence of any express 
prohibition.91  Justices Thomas and Scalia were joined by Chief 
Justice Roberts in the latter case.92 
In these cases, the text provided a greater impediment to an 
expansive interpretation concerning protection from retaliation than in 
other cases in that the statutes were silent on the subject of retaliation.  
This perhaps explains the greater division within the Court and the 
dissents of the more textualist-minded members of the Court in 
particular.  However, silence is an obstacle more easily overcome 
than actual language that is contrary to a particular construction.  In 
these cases, the more significant hurdle to an expansive interpretation 
was existing precedent.  In each case, there were prior decisions of the 
 
86 Jackson, 544 U.S. at 171. 
87 Id. at 173. 
88 Id. at 174. 
89 Id. at 178. 
90 See id. at 184 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for ignoring statutory 
text). 
91 Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 506 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing 
the federal-sector provision of the ADEA); CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 
457 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing § 1981). 
92 Gomez-Perez, 553 U.S. at 492 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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Court that were in tension with the Court’s ultimate interpretation.93  
But precedent can be distinguished more easily than language can be 
read to mean something contrary to what it seems to say.  Thus, a 
majority of Justices were willing to sign on to each of these opinions 
and recognize the existence of statutory protection from retaliation. 
C.  Summary 
Textualism has won the war with respect to the interpretation of 
statutory antiretaliation provisions.  Justice Breyer perhaps said it best 
in Burlington Northern when, in construing § 704(a), he noted that 
“purpose reinforces what language already indicates”—in that 
instance, that § 704(a) provided broad coverage from retaliation.94  
Breyer’s use of the word “reinforces” is instructive.95 
Jackson, CBOCS West, and Gomez-Perez are as close as the Court 
has come to departing from statutory text in order to recognize a 
plaintiff’s right to recover for employer retaliation.  And, even in 
these cases, the Court has stressed its fidelity to the text.  The statutes 
in question presented the Court with interpretive problems in the 
sense that they did not specifically speak to the question of retaliation.  
However, the Court has yet to confront statutory antiretaliation 
language that strongly suggests a restrictive interpretation with 
respect to protection from retaliation.96 
This emphasis on text is, of course, consistent with the rise of 
textualism in other contexts.  But textualism’s triumph in the statutory 
retaliation field is noteworthy in at least two respects.  First, it stands 
 
93 See Zimmer, supra note 22, at 922–23, 929–32 (noting the important role precedent 
played in the decisions). 
94 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 64 (2006) (emphasis 
added). 
95 See generally Zehrt, supra note 16, at 177 (noting the Court’s reliance on text and 
precedent rather than policy in interpreting antiretaliation provisions). 
96 The plaintiff in Clark County School District v. Breeden lost before the Court, but the 
Court’s decision did not require interpretation of the statute.  532 U.S. 268, 274 (2001) 
(per curiam).  Instead, the Court assumed that the lower court’s interpretation was correct, 
but held that, as applied, the interpretation still precluded the plaintiff from winning.  Id. at 
270–71.  The only noteworthy exception to the winning streak of retaliation plaintiffs is 
Garcetti v. Ceballos.  547 U.S. 410 (2006).  There, an employee claimed he had been 
retaliated against after speaking out about unlawful activity on the part of a prosecutor’s 
office.  Id. at 415.  In a five-to-four decision, the Court held that the employee’s claim 
failed because the employee’s allegedly protected activity arose out of his job duties.  Id. 
at 424.  Although an employment retaliation case, Garcetti is also a constitutional case.  
Id. at 417–20.  Thus, the rules with which the Court had to contend were largely judge-
made as opposed to statutory in nature. 
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in contrast to the Court’s interpretive approach with respect to the 
antidiscrimination provisions contained in first-generation 
employment discrimination statutes like Title VII.  As one author has 
noted, Title VII’s basic directive amounts to little more than “Thou 
shalt not discriminate.”97  Title VII is a broadly worded statute that 
leaves judges with significant room to shape policy.98  Given the lack 
of specificity in Title VII’s language, it is not surprising that many of 
the landmark Title VII cases—including McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green99 and Griggs v. Duke Power Co.100—make only passing 
reference to the statutory text, and the tests that emerged from these 
cases were almost totally judge-made.101  And at the time of some of 
the most important decisions, textualism had not yet gained 
ascendancy.102  Even with the rise of textualism, the broadly worded 
text of Title VII still sometimes forces the Court to engage in 
common-law rulemaking that has only a limited connection to the 
text.103 
Even when a discrimination statute employed more specific 
language, federal courts sometimes paid relatively little attention to 
that language.  For example, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973104 
employed the same definition of disability that was later used in the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).105  For several years prior to 
the passage of the ADA, federal courts sometimes barely paused to 
 
97 Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and 
Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
413, 413 (1991) (explaining that many earlier civil rights statutes took this approach). 
98 See id. at 515. 
99 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
100 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
101 See generally Charles A. Sullivan, The World Turned Upside Down?: Disparate 
Impact Claims by White Males, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1505, 1507 (2004) (referring to the 
Supreme Court’s disparate impact jurisprudence as “judicially-created”). 
102 See generally Molot, supra note 34, at 24 (identifying the 1980s and 1990s as the 
starting point for modern textualism). 
103 Alex B. Long, “If the Train Should Jump the Track . . .”: Divergent Interpretations 
of State and Federal Employment Discrimination Statutes, 40 GA. L. REV. 469, 486–89 
(2006) (explaining how the Supreme Court’s approach to some employment 
discrimination statutes “resembles common law rulemaking and constitutional 
interpretation more than traditional statutory interpretation”). 
104 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–794 (2006). 
105 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 3(2)(A), 104 Stat. 
327, 330 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2006)); Stephen F. Befort, 
Let’s Try This Again: The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 Attempts to Reinvigorate the 
“Regarded as” Prong of the Statutory Definition of Disability, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 993, 
998. 
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even question whether an individual satisfied the same statutory 
definition employed in the Rehabilitation Act.106  The Act’s 
definition of disability was packed with terms in need of 
interpretation, yet federal courts often failed to parse the language.  
Indeed, in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,107 the Court 
quickly glossed over the same language that it would later focus 
intently on in the ADA context and adopted an expansive 
interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act’s definition of disability.108  
However, in a series of decisions in 1999, the Supreme Court engaged 
in a painstaking (and painful) parsing of the ADA’s statutory 
definition of disability and adopted a strict construction of the terms 
within that definition.109 
In contrast to the Court’s discrimination decisions, the Court’s 
retaliation decisions have all taken place since textualism’s rise to 
power.  And in general, antiretaliation provisions tend to be wordier 
than the antidiscrimination provisions with which the Court has 
historically dealt.  There have been several cases in which the relevant 
provision contained no explicit mention of protection from 
retaliation.110  But aside from these cases, the Court has been required 
to parse text to determine the scope of an individual’s protection from 
retaliation. 
The other noteworthy feature of textualism’s triumph in the field of 
statutory antiretaliation law is the fact that plaintiffs have had far 
greater success in their statutory retaliation claims than have 
discrimination plaintiffs.  Discrimination plaintiffs have had less 
success under broadly worded statutes like Title VII than have 
retaliation plaintiffs.  But discrimination plaintiffs have fared even 
worse in the case of the ADA, which contains far more textual 
detail.111  Indeed, the Court’s increasingly textual approach has 
repeatedly been identified as one of the main culprits behind ADA 
 
106 See Long, supra note 103, at 529 (“Initially, relatively few individuals were denied 
coverage under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.”). 
107 480 U.S. 273 (1987). 
108 See id. at 281 (concluding that the fact that plaintiff’s impairment was serious 
enough to require hospitalization was “more than sufficient” to satisfy the statutory 
definition of disability). 
109 Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565–67 (1999); Murphy v. United 
Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 519 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 
471, 478–80 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
110 See supra notes 84–92 and accompanying text. 
111 Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 108–10 (1999). 
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plaintiffs’ lack of success.112  It seems odd, therefore, that a textualist 
approach could produce such completely different outcomes in the 
retaliation cases. 
Perhaps this is why some have looked for some other explanation 
for why the members of the Court seem to have particular sympathy 
for the victims of employment retaliation.113  To be sure, these 
theories may go a long way toward explaining the outcomes of some 
of the decisions.  The Justices’ generally favorable views as to the 
purpose of antiretaliation provisions or generally sympathetic views 
of retaliation plaintiffs may, for example, explain how the plaintiffs in 
Jackson, CBOCS West, and Gomez-Perez were able to garner a 
majority in these decisions, which, given the absence of statutory text, 
could easily have been decided differently.  They might also help 
explain how the plaintiff in Kasten was able to get several members 
of the Court’s conservative wing to side with Justice Breyer’s more 
expansive interpretation of the FLSA’s antiretaliation provision than 
Justice Scalia’s more limited interpretation when either interpretation, 
based on text alone, would have been plausible. 
But, given the current composition of the Court, sympathy and 
unifying theories will not permit a retaliation plaintiff to prevail when 
the statutory language affirmatively suggests a contrary outcome.  A 
majority of Justices are of a textualist bent, and those who are not still 
heavily stress statutory language.114  For purposes of this Article, 
there are two particularly noteworthy aspects to the Court’s retaliation 
decisions.  First is the extent to which the decisions emphasize text.  
Culminating in Justice Breyer’s multipaged inquiry into the meaning 
of the word “file” in Kasten, the Court has grounded its retaliation 
decisions on statutory language even when that language has provided 
only limited support for the Court’s conclusion.  Subtle differences in 
statutory text and single words have been decisive in the Court’s 
 
112 See, e.g., Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-
Discrimination Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 93 (2000) (discussing the different interpretation and 
struggles to define the protected class of ADA plaintiffs); Michael Selmi, Interpreting the 
Americans with Disabilities Act: Why the Supreme Court Rewrote the Statute, and Why 
Congress Did Not Care, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 525 (2008) (acknowledging “that 
the Supreme Court has read the ADA narrowly, and in a manner that is generally 
inconsistent with congressional intent”). 
113 See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text. 
114 See Zimmer, supra note 22, at 955–57 (classifying the interpretive approaches of the 
members of the Court). 
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analysis.  Thus, the Court has established an interpretive template for 
future decisions involving antiretaliation decisions. 
Second, in each of the statutory retaliation cases in which plaintiffs 
have prevailed, the text posed a relatively weak obstacle to an 
interpretation that would provide protection from retaliation.  In other 
words, the texts permitted a majority of Justices in each case to 
interpret the provision in a manner consistent with their natural 
sympathies or their views as to the proper role of antiretaliation 
provisions.  When the text posed only a weak obstacle to an 
expansive interpretation—as in Crawford—a clear majority formed 
around the expansive interpretation.  When, however, the language 
posed a more formidable obstacle—as in Jackson, CBOCS West, and 
Gomez-Perez—the more textualist-minded Justices were unable to 
look past the obstacles; yet, the obstacles were formidable enough to 
peel away the fifth vote necessary to provide for more expansive 
coverage.  As the rest of this Article argues, retaliation plaintiffs are 
unlikely to enjoy this same success in future decisions. 
II 
WHY STATUTORY RETALIATION PLAINTIFFS WILL EVENTUALLY 
START LOSING IN FRONT OF THE COURT 
There are limits to a judge’s ability to find ambiguity or certainty 
in statutory text.  A judge’s inclination to follow congressional 
purpose or take pragmatic concerns into account can overcome a 
textual impediment if the text amounts only to a speed bump to the 
judge’s approach.  But when the text strongly suggests a particular 
interpretation, a judge’s desire to further the perceived underlying 
purpose of a statute or foster a desirable policy outcome tends to give 
way.  This is especially likely when a court has previously given great 
weight to the presence or absence of particular language when 
interpreting one statute, and the court then confronts a different 
statute with the same language. 
All of the major federal employment statutes have been held to 
prohibit employer retaliation.115  However, with the exception of Title 
VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 
 
115 However, not every statute provides for a private right of action.  See George v. 
Aztec Rental Ctr., Inc., 763 F.2d 184, 187 (5th Cir. 1985) (concluding that no private 
cause of action exists for retaliatory discharge under OSHA); Hernandez v. Mohawk 
Indus., Inc., No. 6:08-cv-927-Orl-28GJK, 2009 WL 3790369, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 10, 
2009) (concluding that the Surface Transportation Assistance Act does not provide for a 
private right of action). 
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virtually none of them use the same language.116  In some cases, these 
linguistic differences may not present courts with any meaningful 
challenges in interpretation.  In others, however, the differences are 
fairly substantial and are likely to mean that individuals who engage 
in action that would clearly be protected under Title VII or the ADEA 
will be unprotected.  While there are any number of unresolved issues 
involving the meaning of statutory antiretaliation provisions, the 
following Part explores those situations in which the luck of 
retaliation plaintiffs in front of the Supreme Court is most likely to 
run out. 
A.  No Protection for Retaliation Not Amounting to an Ultimate 
Employment Action 
A clear example of how retaliation victims may be at the mercy of 
the text of whatever the relevant statute may be is the situation in 
which an employer retaliates against an employee but does not fire, 
demote, or take similar employment-related actions.  In Burlington 
Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, the Court held that Title 
VII prohibits other forms of retaliation not necessarily connected to 
the workplace.117  As discussed, the Court was able to reach this 
decision because the text of § 704(a) permitted and actually created at 
least a weak presumption in favor of this construction of the statutory 
text.118  Whereas the statutory provision outlawing employment 
discrimination specifically referred to employer actions affecting an 
employee’s “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment,” § 704(a), the antiretaliation provision, contained no 
such limiting language.119  Since the text of § 704(a) allowed for and 
arguably encouraged a broad reading, the Court was able to also rely 
on the strong policy arguments favoring the broad reading. 
Most of the major federal employment statutes resemble § 704(a) 
in that they are not limited to retaliation affecting “the compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.”  The FMLA, for 
 
116 The ADA’s antiretaliation provision employs language substantially similar to that 
of Title VII and the ADEA.  42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2006).  However, the ADA contains an 
additional section that makes it unlawful for an employer to “coerce, intimidate, threaten, 
or interfere with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his or her 
having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his or her having aided or encouraged any 
other individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by this 
chapter.”  Id. § 12203(b). 
117 See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text. 
118 See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text. 
119 Id. 
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example, provides that it is unlawful for an employer “to discharge or 
in any other manner discriminate against any individual” who has 
engaged in protected activity.120  As a result, federal courts have 
consistently held that Burlington Northern’s material adversity 
standard applies to FMLA retaliation claims.121  Courts have 
similarly relied on the absence of any limiting language in concluding 
that the Burlington Northern standard applies in ERISA and FLSA 
retaliation cases.122 
Many of the lesser-known federal statutes that prohibit employer 
retaliation, however, are by their terms limited to retaliation affecting 
the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.  For example, the 
Asbestos School Hazard Detection and Control Act123 prohibits an 
employer from “discharg[ing] any employee or otherwise 
discriminat[ing] against any employee with respect to the employee’s 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” 
because the employee has engaged in protected activity.124  The 
Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 similarly provides that 
it is unlawful to “discharge an employee, or discipline or discriminate 
against an employee regarding pay, terms, or privileges of 
employment” because the employee has engaged in protected 
activity.125  A host of other federal statutes contain similar 
language.126  The same interpretive issue has arisen under parallel 
state statutes with mixed results.127 
 
120 29 U.S.C. §§ 2615(a)(2), (b) (2006) (emphasis added). 
121 See, e.g., Millea v. Metro-N. R.R., Nos. 10-409-cv (L); 10-564-cv (XAP), 2011 WL 
3437513, at *6 (2d Cir. Aug. 8, 2011); Metzler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 464 
F.3d 1164, 1171 n.2 (10th Cir. 2006). 
122 Darveau v. Detecon, Inc., 515 F.3d 334, 343 (4th Cir. 2008) (adopting Burlington 
Northern’s material adversity standard for use in FLSA retaliation claims); Mohamed v. 
Sanofi-Aventis Pharm., No. 06 Civ. 1504, 2009 WL 4975260, at *22–24 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 
22, 2009) (stating, “In light of Burlington Northern, it would seem that retaliation under 
ERISA section 510 is not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and 
conditions of employment,” but deciding the case on other grounds); Mercier v. 
Boilermakers Apprenticeship & Training Fund, No. 07-cv-11307-DPW, 2009 WL 458556, 
at *23 (D. Mass. Feb. 10, 2009) (concluding that retaliation under ERISA is not limited to 
adverse employment actions). 
123 Pub. L. No. 96-270, 94 Stat. 487 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3611 (2006)). 
124 20 U.S.C. § 3608. 
125 49 U.S.C. § 31105 (2006). 
126 See infra Appendix. 
127 See Alex B. Long, Viva State Employment Law! State Law Retaliation Claims in a 
Post-Crawford/Burlington Northern World, 77 TENN. L. REV. 253, 272–73 (2010) (noting 
conflicting results in decisions in Washington and California).  Thus far, decisional law on 
this issue involving the lesser-known federal statutes is sparse.  Some courts have noted 
that the difference in language poses an interpretive issue but have assumed, without 
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The fact that a statute contains language specifically referring to an 
employee’s pay, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment does 
not necessarily mean that it is limited to retaliation involving 
employment-related actions.  A court could, as one has, conclude that 
Congress’s use of these terms represented a “kitchen-sink attempt at 
comprehensiveness, rather than a limitation by way of expressio 
unius, and should be construed to mean ‘any adverse action.’”128  
However, the more natural reading of this kind of statutory language 
would be to limit retaliation to adverse employment actions or 
ultimate employment actions. 
The fact that the Supreme Court placed such great emphasis on the 
absence of the “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment” language in reaching the opposite conclusion in the 
Title VII context only supports this narrow reading of this kind of 
statutory language; the Court’s focusing so heavily on the absence of 
the language may prove exceedingly difficult to subsequently 
overlook the presence of the same language in a different statute.  The 
likely result will be that employees who are unfortunate enough to 
have to sue under these kinds of statutes will be denied protection.129 
B.  No Protection for Making Internal Complaints or Providing 
Information to an Employer 
Another area in which some retaliation plaintiffs are currently 
losing in the lower courts and are likely to lose in front of the 
Supreme Court is where an employee complains or notifies an 
employer about unlawful conduct.  At first, this seems 
counterintuitive.  An employee who complains internally to an 
 
deciding, that Burlington Northern’s material adversity standard applies.  See Melton v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 373 F. App’x 572, 577 (6th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (noting the 
difference in statutory language between Title VII and the Surface Transportation 
Assistance Act, but declining to decide whether Title VII’s material adversity standard 
applies). 
128 See Mattei v. Mattei, 126 F.3d 794, 806 (6th Cir. 1997) (concluding the same result 
about ERISA’s antiretaliation provision). 
129 On their face, some statutes provide expansive protection from retaliation.  For 
example, the FMLA prohibits an employer from discharging “or in any other manner” 
discriminating against an individual for engaging in protected activity.  29 U.S.C. § 2615 
(2006).  If given a literal interpretation, these statutes would establish a different standard 
than the material adversity standard adopted by the Court in Burlington Northern in Title 
VII cases.  Despite this difference in text, some courts have adopted Burlington Northern’s 
material adversity standard for use in FMLA retaliation cases.  See, e.g., Wierman v. 
Casey’s Gen. Stores, 638 F.3d 984, 999 (8th Cir. 2011); Metzler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank 
of Topeka, 464 F.3d 1164, 1171 n.2 (10th Cir. 2006). 
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employer about unlawful discrimination is protected from retaliation 
under § 704(a) of Title VII, which protects one who has “opposed” 
unlawful employer discrimination.130  Even prior to the Court’s 
decision in Kasten, the majority of federal appellate courts had 
concluded that the FLSA’s antiretaliation provision protects an 
employee who filed a written complaint internally,131 and now the 
Supreme Court has held that this protection extends to oral complaints 
as well.  One might logically assume then that, given the preference 
of federal courts for uniform construction of the array of federal 
employment statutes, making an internal, oral complaint of unlawful 
conduct or providing information about such conduct is per se 
protected conduct under federal law.  However, a quick examination 
of the language of ERISA and some of the other federal statutes 
regulating the workplace should quickly dispel such confidence.132 
1.  No Protection for Internal Complaints 
In Kasten, the Court was able to conclude that filing an internal 
oral complaint is protected conduct under the FLSA, in part, because 
the “filed any complaint” language was sufficiently removed from the 
language requiring interaction with the government to permit the 
conclusion that an employee need not file a formal complaint with a 
court or government agency in order to be protected.133  Not every 
antiretaliation provision is structured in this manner.  To the extent 
some statutes protect the filing of complaints or the providing of 
 
130 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006); Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 
F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 2001); Sumner v. U.S. Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 
1990); B. Glenn George, Revenge, 83 TUL. L. REV. 439, 448 (2008).  The FMLA also 
contains this “opposition” language, and several courts have concluded that one who 
complains internally to an employer is protected from retaliation under the FMLA.  See 
Schrieber v. Fed. Express Corp., 698 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (N.D. Okla. 2010) (denying the 
defendant’s summary judgment motion as to the plaintiff’s retaliation claim when the 
plaintiff had filed an internal complaint related to alleged discrimination under the FMLA 
and the ADEA); Mahoney v. Ernst & Young LLP, 487 F. Supp. 2d 780 (S.D. Tex. 2006) 
(concluding that a letter to the employer from the employee’s attorney complaining about 
denial of FMLA rights was protected under the FMLA’s opposition clause). 
131 See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 838 (7th Cir. 
2009) (noting the “vast majority of circuit courts to consider this issue” had reached this 
conclusion), rev’d on other grounds, Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 
131 S. Ct. 1325, 1336 (2011). 
132 There are some federal statutes—such as the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural 
Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1855(a)—that contain antiretaliation provisions that 
closely resemble the FLSA’s and will therefore probably be interpreted consistent with 
Kasten. 
133 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
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information, they do so with language that is closely connected to 
language describing interaction with the government or a connection 
to the formal mechanisms employed to enforce the relevant statute.  
Thus, there is a strong chance that the Supreme Court would construe 
any number of statutes so that providing information or filing a 
complaint are protected activities only when conducted in connection 
with a judicial or administrative proceeding. 
The most obvious example of this type of statute is Title VII.  Title 
VII’s participation clause prohibits retaliation against an employee 
because the employee “has made a charge, testified, assisted, or 
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing 
under this subchapter.”134  Each protected activity in the clause—
making a charge, testifying, assisting, and participating—is closely 
linked to language referring to proceedings associated with Title VII.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, virtually every federal court to consider the 
issue has concluded that an employee who provides information as 
part of an employer’s internal process or investigation into unlawful 
discrimination is not protected under Title VII because the 
participation clause extends only to conduct related to a formal 
proceeding under Title VII.135 
Of course, the Supreme Court had the chance in Crawford v. 
Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County to expand 
the scope of protection from retaliation by holding that those who 
participate in an internal proceeding or investigation are entitled to 
protection under Title VII’s participation clause.136  Instead, the Court 
chose to categorize the employee’s act of providing information as 
part of an internal investigation as “opposition” conduct and expressly 
declined to consider whether the conduct might also be classified as 
“participation” conduct.137  While Crawford was considered a victory 
for Title VII retaliation plaintiffs, it was not the kind of resounding 
victory that would assist all similarly situated plaintiffs outside the 
Title VII context.  The Court’s silence on the question of whether 
providing information as part of an internal investigation could be 
protected “participation” conduct was deafening in the face of 
overwhelming precedent among the lower courts that such conduct is 
not protected under the participation clause.  Thus, the Supreme 
Court’s conspicuous silence in the face of the overwhelming majority 
 
134 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
135 See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
136 129 S. Ct. 846 (2009). 
137 Id. at 853. 
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approach in the Title VII context has obvious repercussions for 
similarly situated plaintiffs who claim protection under similarly 
worded antiretaliation provisions. 
At least in the Title VII context, an employee who complains 
internally about a possible Title VII violation may still be protected 
under Title VII’s opposition clause.  However, most statutes 
governing the workplace do not contain any “opposition” 
language.138  Thus, other retaliation plaintiffs may not be so fortunate. 
The majority of courts to consider the issue have concluded that the 
filing of an internal complaint is not protected activity under 
ERISA.139  ERISA’s antiretaliation provision provides that it is 
unlawful for an employer to retaliate “against any person because he 
has given information or has testified or is about to testify in any 
inquiry or proceeding relating to this chapter or the Welfare and 
Pension Plans Disclosure Act.”140  An employee who complains 
internally about a possible ERISA violation has certainly “given 
information” as the Act requires.  However, a slight majority of 
federal appellate courts to consider the issue have concluded that an 
employee who, unsolicited, complains internally to another employer 
has not engaged in protected activity.141  These courts have reasoned 
that in the absence of an employer’s request for information, an 
employee who complains internally is not giving information as part 
of an “inquiry” or “proceeding.”142  In addition, according to these 
courts, the term “proceeding” refers to the formal process for 
obtaining a remedy under the statute, not something as informal as the 
making of an internal complaint.143 
In reaching these conclusions, courts have turned the different 
language of Title VII and the FLSA against ERISA retaliation 
plaintiffs.  Title VII explicitly protects one who opposes unlawful 
 
138 See infra Appendix. 
139 Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2010); Nicolaou v. 
Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 329 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam); King v. Marriott Int’l, 
Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2003).  The Fifth and Ninth Circuits have held that such 
conduct is protected under ERISA.  Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1311, 
1314 (5th Cir. 1994); Hashimoto v. Bank of Haw., 999 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1993); see 
also Jessica Barclay-Strobel, Comment, Shooting the Messenger: How Enforcement of 
FLSA and ERISA Is Thwarted by Courts’ Interpretations of the Statutes’ Antiretaliation 
and Remedies Provisions, 58 UCLA L. REV. 521, 533–36 (2010) (discussing the circuit 
split on the issue). 
140 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006). 
141 See Barclay-Strobel, supra note 139. 
142 Edwards, 610 F.3d at 223. 
143 Id. 
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discrimination.  According to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit, Congress could have chosen to include similar “opposition” 
language in ERISA’s antiretaliation provision but declined to do so.  
Characterizing Congress’s inaction as a conscious choice, the court 
concluded that Congress chose not to provide protection to those who 
oppose or otherwise raise concerns internally about an ERISA 
violation.144  The Third Circuit has similarly turned the FLSA’s 
language against ERISA retaliation plaintiffs.  The court noted that 
the FLSA prohibits retaliation against one who has “filed any 
complaint,” which could include an internal complaint.145  The words 
“any complaint” are noticeably absent from ERISA’s language.  
Therefore, while Kasten might suggest a more expansive reading of 
ERISA’s language, Kasten’s conclusion that internal complaints are 
protected under the FLSA does not necessarily require a parallel 
conclusion under ERISA’s distinct statutory language.146 
ERISA and the FLSA actually use somewhat similar language in 
their antiretaliation provisions.  Thus, it may be that ERISA’s text 
does not pose the sort of textual hurdle that is virtually 
insurmountable if one desires a broad interpretation.  However, other 
statutes have similar gaps in coverage and contain language that is 
perhaps more resistant to an expansive interpretation.  For example, 
the Immigration Reform and Control Act’s (IRCA)147 antiretaliation 
provision prohibits retaliation against one who has “filed a charge or a 
complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an 
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this section.”148  This 
language is obviously quite similar to Title VII’s participation clause, 
thus suggesting a similarly restrictive interpretation.  Outside of the 
Title VII context, however, some courts have been more generous in 
their interpretation of similarly worded statutes and have concluded 
that internal complaints are protected.149  But the differences in 
 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 224. 
146 Id. at 225. 
147 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a, 1324b (2006). 
148 Id. § 1324b(a)(5) (emphasis added). 
149 See Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm’rs v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 992 F.2d 474, 478 
(3d Cir. 1993) (interpreting § 507(a) of the Clean Water Act to permit a retaliation claim 
based on an internal complaint); Rayner v. Smirl, 873 F.2d 60, 64 (4th Cir. 1989) 
(concluding that the Federal Railroad Safety Act protects the filing of internal complaints); 
Phillips v. Interior Bd. of Mine Operations Appeals, 500 F.2d 772, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1974) 
(concluding that internal complaints are protected under the Federal Coal Mine Health & 
Safety Act, while recognizing that the holding extended beyond the literal language of the 
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outcomes are sometimes dependent on minor variations among the 
statutes, and the decisions are mixed.150 
There are strong arguments on both sides regarding the 
interpretation of IRCA’s antiretaliation provision.  The most natural 
reading of the text would seem to require that the employee file a 
complaint in connection with some type of formal process.151  
However, this is not the only possible reading of the text, and a 
contrary reading certainly makes more sense as a policy matter.  The 
IRCA is designed, in part, to address employers’ discrimination 
against “documented workers” because of their national origin or 
citizenship and to criminalize the employment of undocumented 
workers.152  In many instances, the individuals most likely to be 
affected by or have knowledge of such practices are those who, in the 
words of one author, “often lack even the most rudimentary 
understanding of their legal rights, are vulnerable to exploitation, and 
are all but invisible to most of the citizenry.”153  For example, in one 
of the few reported IRCA retaliation cases, the employee who 
complained to authorities spoke no English.154  When interpreting the 
FLSA’s ambiguous statutory language in Kasten, the Court noted that 
it would undermine Congress’s purpose in protecting workers from 
exploitive practices to limit the protection of the antiretaliation 
provision to when an employee filed a written complaint.  “Why,” the 
Court asked, “would Congress want to limit the enforcement 
scheme’s effectiveness by inhibiting use of the Act’s complaint 
 
Act); Neal v. Honeywell, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 266, 273 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (concluding that the 
False Claims Act prohibits retaliation based on the filing of an internal complaint). 
150 Compare Brown & Root, Inc. v. Donovan, 747 F.2d 1029, 1031–32 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(concluding that internal complaints are not protected under the Energy Reorganization 
Act as originally codified), with Mackowiak v. Univ. Nuclear Sys., Inc., 735 F.2d 1159, 
1163 (9th Cir. 1984) (reaching the opposite conclusion).  The Third Circuit concluded in 
Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners v. United States Department of Labor that the 
Clean Water Act protected internal complaints.  992 F.2d at 480.  Nearly twenty years 
later, the same court was forced to distinguish the language of the Clean Water Act from 
the similarly worded language of ERISA while concluding that ERISA did not protect one 
who complains internally about an ERISA violation.  Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, 
Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2010). 
151 See generally Phillips, 500 F.2d at 779 (concluding that internal complaints are 
protected under the similarly worded Federal Coal Mine Health & Safety Act, while 
recognizing that the holding extended beyond literal language of the Act). 
152 Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 892 (1984); Jie v. Liang Tai Knitwear Co., 
107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 682, 687 (Ct. App. 2001). 
153 Fran Ansley, Standing Rusty and Rolling Empty: Law, Poverty, and America’s 
Eroding Industrial Base, 81 GEO. L.J. 1757, 1771 (1993). 
154 Jie, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 685. 
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procedure by those who would find it difficult to reduce their 
complaints to writing, particularly illiterate, less educated, or 
overworked workers?”155  One might make a similar argument with 
respect to the IRCA: why would Congress want to limit the 
enforcement scheme’s effectiveness by inhibiting use of the Act’s 
complaint procedure by those who frequently lack an understanding 
of their legal rights and the structures that protect those rights? 
The difficulty with making this type of argument is that the text of 
the IRCA poses a fairly significant obstacle to what is clearly the 
better policy approach.  Indeed, the interpretation of the IRCA 
presents a classic illustration of the battle between text-based and 
more pragmatic forms of interpretation.  But given the Court’s past 
approach to the interpretation of antiretaliation provisions, the textual 
obstacles involving the IRCA and similarly worded statutes are likely 
to prove too pronounced to permit a majority of the Court to adopt the 
type of expansive interpretation it has adopted in the past. 
2.  No Protection for Providing Information to an Employer 
A closely related problem involves the coverage of an employee 
who provides information to an employer about a possible violation 
of the law but does so in a nonconfrontational manner.  Kasten clearly 
provides protection for employees who affirmatively complain about 
unlawful behavior under the FLSA.  And Crawford held that an 
employee who provides a “disapproving account” of an employee’s 
behavior in response to employer questioning as part of an internal 
investigation is entitled to protection under Title VII’s opposition 
clause.  The Court also approvingly quoted an EEOC guideline 
expressing the view that an employee is protected under the 
opposition clause when the “employee communicates to her employer 
a belief that the employer has engaged in . . . a form of employment 
discrimination.”156  But what if the information the employee 
provides is more neutral in character, or what if the employee is 
acting as more of a facilitator, mediator, or intermediary?  Is such an 
employee covered if the employee incurs the employer’s wrath? 
As was the case in Crawford, an employee may be dragged 
involuntarily into an employer’s internal investigation or a coworker’s 
 
155 Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1333 (2011). 
156 Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 129 S. Ct. 846, 851 
(2009) (citing 2 EEOC Compliance Manual § 8-II(B)(1) (1998), available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/retal.html). 
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lawsuit.157  When the employee provides information in response to 
questioning, the employee may not convey a belief that discrimination 
has taken place and may even have no idea that the information she is 
providing is damaging to the employer’s case.  In such a case, an 
employee would be providing information that is relevant to a charge 
of unlawful activity but might not be “opposing” unlawful conduct 
within the meaning of Title VII or another statute. 
In one case, an employee was identified in discovery material as a 
potential witness in a coworker’s FMLA lawsuit against an 
employer.158  The employer instructed the employee to notify the 
employer if the coworker’s attorney contacted the employee about the 
coworker’s FMLA claim.159  The employee replied that he would not 
tell the employer if he was contacted and that he would “tell the truth” 
if subpoenaed.160  The district court concluded that these statements 
were too equivocal in nature to qualify as opposition conduct.161  Nor, 
the court concluded, had the employee engaged in protected activity 
by participating in an FMLA proceeding because simply being listed 
as a witness did not amount to participation.162  Thus, the court 
dismissed the employee’s retaliation claim on a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion.163 
There are also numerous cases in which one employee has assisted 
another by helping to bring the coworker’s concerns over 
discrimination to the attention of management.  Yet, in all of these 
cases, the courts have held that facilitating someone else’s complaint 
or acting as an intermediary does not qualify as “opposing” unlawful 
conduct.164  It is only when the plaintiff’s assistance crosses the fine 
 
157 See Harris v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 255 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1356 (N.D. Ga. 
2002) (concluding that an employee who refused to participate in the employer’s internal 
investigation into the coworker’s discrimination claim did not engage in protected 
activity). 
158 Lehmann v. Aramark Healthcare Support Servs., LLC, 630 F. Supp. 2d 388, 391 (D. 
Del. 2009). 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 393. 
162 Id. at 394. 
163 Id. at 394–95.  The decision seems wrong on its face in light of the fact that the 
FMLA’s antiretaliation provision protects not only those who provide information or 
testify in a formal proceeding but also those who are “about to” provide information or 
testify.  29 U.S.C. §§ 2615(b)(2)–(3) (2006).  The fact that the employee had been listed as 
a potential witness in the FMLA lawsuit seems like it should suffice to establish that the 
employee was about to provide information or testify. 
164 Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 350 (3d Cir. 2006); Wells v. Securitas Sec. 
Servs. USA, Inc., No. 07-15500, 2009 WL 818005, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 27, 2009); 
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line into being more openly adverse to the employer’s interests that 
the conduct amounts to opposition.165  Accordingly, it is unlikely that 
this type of plaintiff would be protected under the opposition clause. 
This conclusion is largely bolstered by the Crawford decision.  
Nearly all of the examples the Court used in attempting to explain 
what qualifies as “opposing” unlawful conduct involved expressions 
of disapproval communicated directly to the employer.  From 
providing a disapproving account to the employer of an employee’s 
behavior, to communicating a belief to the employer that the 
employer’s conduct was unlawful, to refusing to obey the employer’s 
orders, the examples the Court relied upon involved expressions of 
disapproval.166  Admittedly, the Court’s opinion hints at the 
likelihood that an employee who is involuntarily drawn into an 
internal investigation and “report[s] discrimination in response to the 
[employer’s] enquiries” should be considered to have opposed the 
employer’s conduct.167  But even here, the Court’s sympathy is 
premised on the assumption that the employee expresses her belief to 
the employer that discrimination has occurred.  This is certainly the 
view of Justices Alito and Thomas, who concurred in the judgment 
but argued that the term “opposition” should include only “active and 
purposive” conduct.168  In sum, Crawford does not provide much 
 
Sawicki v. Am. Plastic Toys, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 910, 917–18 (E.D. Mich. 2001); Guess 
v. City of Miramar, 889 So. 2d 840, 847 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); see also Isler v. 
Keystone Sch. Dist., No. 07cv1335, 2008 WL 3540603, at *11 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2008) 
(rejecting a bus driver’s ADA retaliation claim that he was “advoca[ting] for a disabled 
student” on his route by describing an incident and offering an alternative route because 
there was no evidence “that he ever explicitly or implicitly opposed some discriminatory 
practice”). 
165 See Collazo v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Mfg., Inc., 617 F.3d 39, 49 (1st Cir. 2010) 
(concluding that a supervisor who assisted and supported a subordinate in pursuing her 
internal complaint had taken action adverse to employer and had engaged in protected 
opposition conduct); Sumner v. U.S. Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 1990) 
(discussing protected opposition conduct in terms of “informal protests of discriminatory 
employment practices, including making complaints to management, writing critical letters 
to customers, protesting against discrimination by industry or society in general, and 
expressing support of co-workers who have filed formal charges”). 
166 Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 129 S. Ct. 846, 850–51 
(2009). 
167 See id. at 852 (noting the unfairness of permitting an employer to fire an employee 
who reports discrimination in response to employer-initiated questioning). 
168 Id. at 854 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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comfort to employees who do not openly express disapproval of an 
employer’s actions to the employer.169 
While Title VII’s opposition clause and the Crawford decision 
provide Title VII retaliation plaintiffs with at least some hope that 
their efforts to assist another employee in conjunction with an internal 
grievance of unlawful conduct might be classified as protected 
opposition conduct, other retaliation plaintiffs do not have even this 
hope.  Title VII and its progeny are rare in their inclusion of statutory 
protection for opposing unlawful conduct.  Most federal statutes that 
prohibit employer retaliation, including the FLSA, ERISA, and the 
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act 
(USERRA) of 1994,170 do not contain an opposition clause.171  Thus, 
the employee who provides information to an employer as part of an 
internal process or who otherwise provides information to the 
employer in a neutral fashion must look elsewhere for protection. 
Under the majority interpretations of these statutes, the employee 
will probably look in vain.  For example, numerous pre-Kasten 
decisions from the lower courts concluded that when an employee’s 
job duties involve ensuring compliance with the relevant law, the 
employee does not “file any complaint” for purposes of a FLSA 
retaliation claim simply by notifying the employer of potential wage 
and hour law violations.  Because the employee has not taken a 
position adverse to the employer’s, the employee’s actions do not 
qualify as filing a complaint.172  While the Court in Kasten held that 
the filing of an internal complaint was protected activity under the 
FLSA, the Court emphasized that the purported complaint must be 
formal enough to put the employer on notice “that a grievance has 
 
169 See generally Calhoun v. U.S. Dep’t. of Labor, 576 F.3d 201, 212 (4th Cir. 2009) 
(concluding that an employee did not engage in protected activity under OSHA’s 
complaint clause because his complaints were not communicated to his supervisors). 
170 38 U.S.C. § 4311 (2006). 
171 See infra Appendix. 
172 The leading case is McKenzie v. Renberg’s, Inc., 94 F.3d 1478, 1486–87 (10th Cir. 
1996).  Other decisions include Claudio-Gotay v. Becton Dickinson Caribe, Ltd., 375 F.3d 
99, 102 (1st Cir. 2004) (concluding that an employee who reported potential overtime 
violations to an employer did not engage in protected activity because the employee was 
protecting the company rather than asserting rights adverse to the company), EEOC v. 
HBE Corp., 135 F.3d 543, 554 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating that an employee must “‘step 
outside’ his employment role” to be protected), and Muniz v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 
731 F. Supp. 2d 961, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (concluding under an analogous state statute 
that an employee’s act of reporting possible wage and hour law violations was not 
protected activity because making such reports was part of her job). 
LONG 1/31/2012  1:39 PM 
558 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90, 525 
been lodged.”173  The Court’s decision, therefore, arguably requires 
that the employee take some type of adversarial stance before a 
complaint is deemed to have been filed.  Nor is it likely that any 
language in a statute that protects those who testify or give 
information in a proceeding will protect such employees because, as 
discussed, courts have interpreted the relevant language to apply only 
when an employee testifies or gives information in connection with a 
formal proceeding of some kind.174 
C.  No Protection for Third-Party Retaliation 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Thompson resolved the issue of 
whether an individual who faces an adverse action due to a 
coworker’s protected activity under Title VII is an “aggrieved person” 
entitled to a remedy under the statute.  Both the ADEA and the ADA 
employ § 706’s “aggrieved person” standard.175  Therefore, the 
Thompson decision should apply with equal force to these statutes.176  
However, the problem of third-party retaliation has also arisen under 
other federal employment statutes, including the FMLA and 
ERISA.177  Given the differences in statutory language, it is 
questionable whether the victims of third-party retaliation will have 
any remedy under these and other federal statutes. 
In Thompson, the plain language of § 704(a) of Title VII may have 
precluded the Court from holding that this section authorized the 
victims of third-party retaliation to recover damages.  As discussed, § 
704(a) speaks directly only to the individual who has engaged in 
protected activity, not the employee who is fired as a consequence of 
another individual engaging in protected activity.178  Not surprisingly, 
the Court looked to a different portion of Title VII to find the 
 
173 Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1334 (2011) 
(emphasis added). 
174 See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
175 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a)(1) (2006). 
176 See Leavitt v. SW & B Constr. Co., 766 F. Supp. 2d 263, 283 (D. Me. 2011) (stating 
that Thompson’s holding likely extends to the ADA). 
177 Elsensohn v. St. Tammany Parish Sheriff’s Office, 530 F.3d 368, 373 (5th Cir. 
2008) (FMLA); Reich v. Cambridgeport Air Sys., Inc., 26 F.3d 1187, 1188 (1st Cir. 1994) 
(OSHA); McKinnon v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 935 F.2d 1187, 1188 (11th Cir. 
1991) (ERISA); Fitzgerald v. Codex Corp., 882 F.2d 586, 589 (1st Cir. 1989) (ERISA).  
See generally Leavitt, 766 F. Supp. at 283 (involving an allegation that a husband was 
retaliated against because he testified on behalf of his wife in a workers’ compensation 
hearing). 
178 See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. 
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statutory hook to permit recovery.  In doing so, however, the Court 
may have limited the ability of employees to succeed on similar 
claims brought under other statutes. 
Most federal employment statutes suffer from the same textual 
limitations as § 704(a).  For example, the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act’s (OSHA) antiretaliation provision prohibits an employer 
from retaliating against an employee “because such employee has 
filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any 
proceeding under or related to this [Act] or has testified or is about to 
testify in any such proceeding or because of the exercise by such 
employee on behalf of himself or others of any right afforded by this 
[Act].”179  ERISA and the FLSA both include similar language, as do 
many of the lesser-known federal statutes.180  Thus, those who have 
faced an adverse employment action due to a coworker’s protected 
activity under these other statutes must hope that the relevant statute 
contains language similar to Title VII’s “person aggrieved” language 
or contains some other statutory hook permitting recovery.  Some 
statutes contain this kind of language;181 others, like USERRA, do 
not.182 
If the statute in question does not contain the “aggrieved person” 
language or something similar, the victim of third-party retaliation 
would be forced to hope that the Court would gloss over the 
unfavorable statutory text in favor of the policy against permitting 
such employer behavior.  But the fact that the Court in Thompson 
never even considered this possibility and focused exclusively on 
Title VII’s “aggrieved person” language would seem to undercut the 
chances of this approach succeeding.  Ironically, the Court’s single-
minded focus in Thompson on Title VII’s “aggrieved person” 
language may actually be a hindrance to retaliation plaintiffs outside 
 
179 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (emphasis added). 
180 See infra Appendix.  The IRCA’s antiretaliation provision contains broader language 
that might cover third-party retaliation.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(5) (2006) (prohibiting 
retaliation “against any individual for the purpose of interfering with any right or privilege 
secured under this section”). 
181 See, e.g., Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 
1854(a) (containing “aggrieved person” language); Hernandez v. Ruiz, 812 F. Supp. 734, 
735 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (establishing a right of action under the Migrant and Seasonal 
Agricultural Protection Act for the children of farm workers even though the children were 
not employees of the employer); see also, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 
U.S.C. § 660(c)(2) (providing that “[a]ny employee who believes that he has been 
discharged or otherwise discriminated against . . . in violation of this subsection” may file 
a complaint) (emphasis added). 
182 38 U.S.C. §§ 4322(a), 4323(d) (2006). 
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of the Title VII context.  Alternatively, the victim might be forced to 
argue that denying recovery in such cases would produce absurd 
results.  But the Court has declared that it rarely invokes the absurdity 
doctrine,183 and textualist judges in particular tend to disfavor the 
doctrine.184 
Even when a statute contains such language, the availability of a 
remedy will not always be clear.  For example, the FMLA provides 
that “any eligible employee affected” by an employer’s unlawful 
retaliation may recover damages or obtain equitable relief.185  An 
employee who is fired as a result of a coworker’s protected activity 
would presumably be an “employee affected” by the employer’s 
unlawful conduct under the reasoning of Thompson.  However, only 
employees who have worked for at least twelve months and for at 
least 1250 hours in that twelve-month period are “eligible” under the 
FMLA, thus effectively excluding some new or part-time employees 
from coverage.186  ERISA allows a “participant, beneficiary, or 
fiduciary” to bring a civil action to enjoin an unlawful practice or 
obtain equitable relief to address an unlawful practice.187  ERISA 
places no other restrictions on who may bring a civil action, so an 
employee who has been discharged because a coworker engaged in a 
protected act might be able to pursue a remedy based upon the 
statutory language and the logic of Thompson.  However, based on 
prior Supreme Court precedent, some courts have concluded that 
compensatory and punitive damages are not authorized for a violation 
since the term “equitable relief” has been held not to encompass 
monetary damages.188  Thus, the victim of third-party retaliation 
might be unable to obtain a monetary remedy under ERISA. 
 
183 Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 459 (2002). 
184 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Judges as Honest Agents, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 915, 921 (2010) (noting “the textualist position that the absurdity doctrine should 
be limited to linguistic problems; otherwise the judiciary can assume too much power by 
waving its hand and declaring ‘absurdity’ whenever the law produces an unpleasant 
result”). 
185 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1). 
186 See, e.g., Nance v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 527 F.3d 539, 557 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(concluding that an employee who failed to meet the 1250-hour requirement was not 
covered under FMLA); Plumley v. S. Container, Inc., 303 F.3d 364, 372 (1st Cir. 2002) 
(reinforcing the strict application of the requirement of 1250 hours within twelve months 
and denying equitable arguments to the contrary). 
187 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3); accord id. § 1140. 
188 Alllinder v. Inter-City Prods. Corp., 152 F.3d 544, 552 (6th Cir. 1998); Barclay-
Strobel, supra note 139, at 559.  Similarly, the FLSA provides that an employer who 
engages in unlawful retaliation is “liable for such legal or equitable relief as may be 
appropriate to effectuate the purposes” of the provision.  29 U.S.C. § 216(b).  The fact that 
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D.  Other Unresolved Issues 
There are also a number of other interpretive issues that have yet to 
be resolved by the Court.  In some of these instances, it is possible to 
imagine a majority of the Court concluding that the relevant text does 
not pose a serious impediment to broader protection from retaliation.  
In other instances, the relevant language may present significant 
challenges to such an interpretation. 
1.  Anticipatory Retaliation 
In the Title VII context, employers have sometimes taken action 
against an employee before the employee has filed a charge because 
the employer believes the employee may, or is about to, file a charge 
of discrimination.189  As a matter of strict construction, this type of 
“anticipatory retaliation” would not be unlawful under § 704(a).  That 
is because, as written, § 704(a) protects only one who “has opposed” 
(past tense) or “has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated” 
(past tense) in a proceeding, not one whom the employer believes is 
about to do these things.190  Nonetheless, several courts have 
concluded that anticipatory retaliation is actionable under Title VII’s 
participation clause, despite the statute’s use of the past tense.191  
However, some courts have stuck to the literal language of § 704(a) 
and concluded that anticipatory retaliation is not prohibited by the 
participation clause.192  The same issue has arisen with respect to 
other statutes with similarly mixed results.193 
 
the ADEA and FLSA remedies provisions track each other might potentially assist a 
plaintiff in such cases.  See Johnson v. Martin, 473 F.3d 220, 222 (5th Cir. 2006).  Some 
statutes do not provide for a private right of action in the event of retaliation.  See 
Hernandez v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., No. 6:08-cv-927-Orl-28GJK, 2009 WL 3790369, at *5 
(M.D. Fla. Nov. 10, 2009) (stating that the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 
does not provide for a private right of action). 
189 See, e.g., Beckel v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc., 301 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2002); 
Sauers v. Salt Lake Cnty., 1 F.3d 1122, 1128 (10th Cir. 1993). 
190 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006). 
191 Beckel, 301 F.3d at 624; Sauers, 1 F.3d at 1128; EEOC v. Bojangles Rests., Inc., 
284 F. Supp. 2d 320, 328 (M.D.N.C. 2003).  When the employee openly threatens to file a 
charge of discrimination, the employee might also be protected because the employee has 
“opposed” unlawful conduct.  Reeder-Baker v. Lincoln Nat’l Corp., 649 F. Supp. 647, 656 
(N.D. Ind. 1986). 
192 See Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1313 n.3 (6th Cir. 
1989) (stating in dicta that threatening to file a charge is not protected participation 
conduct); Beyah v. Dodaro, 666 F. Supp. 2d 24, 38 n.15 (D.D.C. 2009) (stating that an 
employee could not claim to be protected under the retaliation claim after telling his 
supervisors that he was documenting their discriminatory behavior); Reeder-Baker, 649 F. 
Supp. at 656 (holding that the participation clause does not cover one who intends to file a 
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In contrast, the FMLA specifically protects one who “has given, or 
is about to give, any information” or testify in connection with a 
proceeding.194  A number of other statutes contain similar 
language.195  However, there are at least two reasons why this type of 
statutory language provides less protection than might appear at first 
glance.  First, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has 
interpreted the “about to give” language quite strictly, concluding that 
the language protects an employee who is about to testify only in a 
pending proceeding; thus, if an employer fears an employee may 
testify in a proceeding related to a yet-to-be-filed lawsuit, the 
employee would not be protected.196  Second, some statutes—like the 
FMLA—protect an individual who is retaliated against because he is 
about to testify or provide information in connection with a formal 
proceeding or inquiry but not to the individual who is retaliated 
against because he was about to file a complaint or institute some type 
of formal proceeding.197  In contrast, the Title VII decisions 
recognizing the viability of an anticipatory retaliation claim have 
done so in the context of an employee who was fired because the 
employer believed the employee was about to file a complaint or 
institute a formal proceeding.198  Thus, on its face, Title VII provides 
no protection from anticipatory retaliation but, as interpreted by some 
courts, actually provides greater protection in some respects than 
 
discrimination charge); Burns v. Republic Sav. Bank, 25 F. Supp. 2d 809, 828 (N.D. Ohio 
1998) (stating that the threat to file a charge is not protected activity under the 
participation clause); EEOC v. Johnson Co., No. 1-75-Civ. 317, 1978 WL 197, at *9 (D. 
Minn. Apr. 27, 1978) (same). 
193 See Hill v. Mr. Money Fin. Co., 491 F. Supp. 2d 725, 736 (N.D. Ohio 2007) 
(dismissing an employee’s retaliation claim because, even though the employee had 
threatened to file a complaint under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, he was fired before 
he did so); Mascioli v. Arby’s Rest. Grp., Inc., 610 F. Supp. 2d 419, 430 (W.D. Pa. 2009) 
(noting that several courts have treated termination of an employee in anticipation of 
future leave, or exercising FMLA rights, as an actionable form of anticipatory retaliation). 
194 29 U.S.C. § 2615(b)(2) (2006) (emphasis added). 
195 See infra Appendix. 
196 Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., 228 F.3d 360, 364 (4th Cir. 2000) (FLSA).  But see 
Macktal v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 171 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 1999) (concluding that a plaintiff 
who expressed to his employer an intent to file a complaint with the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission was protected under similar language in the Energy Reorganization Act). 
197 See infra Appendix.  An exception would be the IRCA, which protects an employee 
who “intends to file or has filed a charge or a complaint, testified, assisted, or participated” 
in a proceeding.  8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(5) (2006). 
198 See, e.g., Beckel v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc., 301 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2002); 
Sauers v. Salt Lake Cnty., 1 F.3d 1122, 1128 (10th Cir. 1993); EEOC v. Bojangles Rests., 
Inc., 284 F. Supp. 2d 320, 329 (M.D.N.C. 2003). 
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those statutes that expressly address the problem of anticipatory 
retaliation.199 
2.  The Need for a Reasonable, Good-Faith Belief When Participating 
in a Proceeding 
Another issue yet to be resolved by the Court involves an 
employee’s belief about the illegality of the employer’s conduct.  An 
employee is protected under Title VII when the employee has 
opposed “any practice made an unlawful employment practice” by the 
Act.200  Read literally, an employee is protected only when the 
practice in question is actually illegal.  However, courts have 
uniformly held that to be protected, an employee must simply have a 
reasonable, good-faith belief that the conduct in question was 
unlawful.201  Crawford involved the issue of coverage under the 
opposition clause, yet the Court never raised the issue of whether the 
conduct that was opposed was actually unlawful under Title VII.202  
Therefore, it seems that, as a matter of established practice, an 
employee need establish only that her belief as to the unlawful nature 
of the employer’s conduct was reasonable in order to be protected 
under the opposition clause.203 
 
199 A related issue is whether an employee is entitled to protection when an employer 
takes action against the employee on the basis of a mistaken belief that the employee has 
engaged in protected activity.  There is a split of authority in the Title VII and FLSA 
contexts as to whether an employee is protected under these circumstances.  See Brock v. 
Richardson, 812 F.2d 121, 123 (3d Cir. 1987) (recognizing such claims under the FLSA); 
Ackel v. Nat’l Commc’ns, Inc., 339 F.3d 376, 385 (5th Cir. 2003) (refusing to recognize 
such claims in the Title VII context); Aguilar v. Arthritis Osteoporosis Ctr., No. M-03-
243, 2006 WL 2478476, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2006) (rejecting such claims in the Title 
VII context).  Read literally, most antiretaliation provisions would apply only when an 
employee actually engaged in protected activity.  Aguilar, 2006 WL 2478476, at *9.  
However, a few statutes explicitly provide protection when an employer believes an 
employee has engaged in protected activity, regardless of whether the employee has 
actually done so.  See infra Appendix. 
200 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006). 
201 Brake & Grossman, supra note 15, at 914. 
202 See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 129 S. Ct. 846 
(2009). 
203 Lower courts have also read this same requirement into other statutes with similar 
language.  See, e.g., Selenke v. Med. Imaging of Colo., 248 F.3d 1249, 1264 (10th Cir. 
2001) (concluding that “a reasonable, good faith belief that the statute has been violated 
suffices” to bring an ADA retaliation claim); Burnette v. Northside Hosp., 342 F. Supp. 2d 
1128, 1134 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (stating that under the FLSA, “the complaining employee 
must have an objectively reasonable, good-faith belief that the employer’s conduct is 
unlawful”). 
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In recent years, however, some courts have concluded that in order 
to be protected under Title VII’s participation clause when filing a 
charge of discrimination, an employee must also have a reasonable, 
good-faith belief that the employer’s conduct was unlawful.204  The 
participation clause is silent on the question, but most courts have not 
imposed a reasonableness requirement.  Indeed, courts have expressly 
held that the participation clause covers those who make “false, 
malicious, or even frivolous complaints.”205  These courts have 
reasoned that imposing a reasonableness requirement on employees 
would create a chilling effect and deter victims from coming forward 
with what might be potentially valid claims.206  Title VII is silent on 
the issue, but statutory silence poses, at best, only a minor obstacle to 
a pragmatic interpretation that furthers the goals of antiretaliation 
provisions.  Therefore, it is easy to envision the Supreme Court 
adopting the majority interpretation.  Indeed, given the fact that          
§ 704(a) provides protection to one who has participated “in any 
manner”—a phrase suggesting an expansive interpretation207—
adoption of the majority interpretation is probably the most likely 
outcome. 
But not all statutes present obstacles that are so easily overcome.  
Several other statutes governing the workplace explicitly provide that 
an employee who files a complaint or provides information to a 
government agency about a possible violation of the relevant law is 
protected only when the employee acted with just cause or with a 
reasonable belief that the conduct was unlawful.208  Thus, a reviewing 
 
204 See Lawrence D. Rosenthal, Reading Too Much Into What the Court Doesn’t Write: 
How Some Federal Courts Have Limited Title VII’s Participation Clause’s Protections 
After Clark County School District v. Breeden, 83 WASH. L. REV. 345, 349 (2008). 
205 Id. at 370 (citing Gilooly v. Mo. Dep’t of Health & Senior Servs., 421 F.3d 734, 742 
(Colloton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (recognizing that some courts hold 
that Title VII protects “even false and malicious allegations, or the filing of frivolous 
complaints”)); see also Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 
1312 (6th Cir. 1989) (stating that under the participation clause, protection “is not lost if 
the employee is wrong on the merits of the charge, nor is protection lost if the contents of 
the charge are malicious and defamatory as well as wrong”) (internal citations omitted); 
Womack v. Munson, 619 F.2d 1292, 1298 (8th Cir. 1980) (“The merits of a charge made 
against an employer is irrelevant to its protected status.”); Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe 
Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1007 (5th Cir. 1969) (concluding that the fact that the charge contains 
malicious material does not deprive an employee of protection under the participation 
clause). 
206 Rosenthal, supra note 204, at 395. 
207 EEOC v. Bojangles Rests., Inc., 284 F. Supp. 2d 320, 328 (M.D.N.C. 2003). 
208 Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1855(a) 
(2006) (prohibiting retaliation “against any migrant or seasonal agricultural worker 
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court might have little choice but to apply the text in a literal fashion 
when dealing with these statutes.  As a result, coverage under Title 
VII may be more expansive than under other statutes in this respect. 
3.  Participation Involving Disloyal or Illegal Conduct 
The “in any manner” language of Title VII’s participation clause 
raises another interpretive issue.  In some cases, retaliation plaintiffs 
have engaged in illegal or disloyal conduct—such as wrongfully 
copying an employer’s records—in anticipation of filing a formal 
complaint209 or have lied during the course of a formal proceeding or 
lawsuit.210  Thus, one question that has arisen is whether such an 
employee has engaged in protected participation conduct. 
While Title VII’s participation clause protects one who participates 
“in any manner” in a formal proceeding, its opposition clause lacks 
this expansive language.  As a result, courts have consistently 
concluded that the participation clause affords greater protection from 
retaliation than does the opposition clause.211  Thus, an employee 
who engages in disloyal or illegal behavior may not be entitled to 
protection under the opposition clause, whereas an employee who 
engages in disloyal or illegal conduct while participating in a 
proceeding could be protected if the “in any manner” language is read 
literally.212 
 
because such worker has, with just cause, filed any complaint or instituted, or caused to be 
instituted, any proceeding under or related to this chapter, . . . or because of the exercise, 
with just cause, by such worker on behalf of himself or others of any right or protection 
afforded by this chapter”); Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 
§ 402, 124 Stat. 3885 (codified at 21 U.S.C.A. § 399d(a)(1) (West 2011)) (prohibiting 
retaliation against an employee who “provided, caused to be provided, or is about to 
provide or cause to be provided to the employer, the Federal Government, or the attorney 
general of a State information relating to any violation of, or any act or omission the 
employee reasonably believes to be a violation of any provision of this chapter or any 
order, rule, regulation, standard, or ban under this chapter, or any order, [or] rule”); see 
infra Appendix. 
209 See, e.g., Lord v. City of Ozark, No. 1:10cv451-WHA, 2010 WL 4780680, at *6 
(M.D. Ala. Nov. 17, 2010) (involving an employee who disobeyed her employer’s order 
not to communicate with another employee regarding a pending investigation). 
210 See Rosenthal, supra note 204, at 369 (citing Gilooly v. Mo. Dep’t of Health & 
Senior Servs., 421 F.3d 734, 740 (8th Cir. 2005)) (explaining that “employees cannot gain 
protection under Title VII after filing false charges, lying to investigators, or making 
defamatory statements”). 
211 See Vaughn v. Epworth Villa, 537 F.3d 1147, 1152 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting the 
general approach). 
212 See id. (reaching this conclusion); see also Deravin v. Kerik, 335 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 
2003) (“[R]ead naturally, the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning, and thus, so long as 
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At the same time, some courts have taken the position that there 
must be some limit to the participation clause’s protection.  Thus, 
some courts have held or suggested that an employee who lies in the 
course of an EEOC proceeding or who engages in illegal or disloyal 
conduct in the course of a proceeding is subject to dismissal, either 
because the conduct is not protected under the participation clause213 
or because the employer has a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
for firing the employee.214 
Once again, Title VII’s language differs from that of many other 
federal statutes that lack the “in any manner” language.  While most 
statutes addressing the workplace contain antiretaliation provisions 
that protect employees who participate or provide information to a 
government agency, few contain Title VII’s expansive “in any 
manner” language.215  Thus, there is an additional level of difficulty 
present when construing one of these statutes in a case involving 
disloyal or illegal employee behavior.216 
4.  Assistance 
Another potential interpretive problem results from the failure of 
several major federal employment statutes to prohibit retaliation 
against those who assist other employees.  A Title VII retaliation 
plaintiff who has provided assistance in connection with some type of 
 
Congress did not add any language limiting the breadth of that word, the term ‘any’ must 
be given literal effect.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
213 See Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 5:06CV1086, 2007 WL 1189350, at *10 
(N.D. Ohio Apr. 19, 2007); see also O’Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d 
756, 763–64 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that an employee’s act of rummaging through the 
employer’s records in an attempt to uncover evidence is not protected under the opposition 
clause); Jefferies v. Harris Cnty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1036 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(concluding that an employee’s act of copying and disseminating personnel records is not 
protected opposition conduct); Watkins v. Ford Motor Co., No. C-1-03-033, 2005 WL 
3448036 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 15, 2005) (concluding that an employee’s act of copying 
personnel records and providing them to his attorney was not protected activity under a 
parallel state statute).  See generally Martin v. Mecklenburg Cnty., 151 F. App’x 275, 
280–81 (4th Cir. 2005) (expressing reluctance “to conclude that an employer can never 
dismiss an employee for lying during a Title VII investigation, proceeding, or hearing”). 
214 Vaughn, 537 F.3d at 1153; Lord, 2010 WL 4780680, at *6; see also Mattson v. 
Caterpillar, Inc., 359 F.3d 885 (7th Cir. 2004) (explaining that the defendant’s warning to 
the plaintiff that “making false accusations of sexual harassment could lead to disciplinary 
action and discharge” was a legitimate interest to the company rather than retaliation). 
215 See infra Appendix. 
216 See generally Federal Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1790b(d)(2) (2006) (providing 
that the protections of the whistleblower section of the Act do not apply to an employee 
who “knowingly or recklessly provides substantially false information” to a federal 
examiner). 
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formal proceeding related to a discrimination claim is expressly 
entitled to protection under Title VII’s participation clause.217  This 
language has been held to protect an employee who assists another 
employee in connection with a proceeding.218  The ADEA and ADA 
each contain similar language.219  Some other federal statutes are 
even more explicit, providing protection to one who acts or exercises 
a right on behalf of another.220  In contrast, the FLSA, the FMLA, and 
ERISA do not explicitly provide protection from retaliation to those 
who provide assistance in connection with their discrimination 
claims.221  These statutes do protect those who testify or give 
information in connection with a proceeding under the statutes.222  
However, “assistance” may take other forms apart from providing 
testimony. 
An employee might “assist” a coworker by providing financial 
assistance in conjunction with a lawsuit.223  An employee might assist 
in a proceeding by accompanying a coworker to a proceeding224 or 
providing encouragement to a coworker who is pursuing a claim.225  
The fact that Title VII’s antiretaliation provision protects those who 
provide assistance “in any manner” only bolsters these 
conclusions.226  But none of these actions would probably be 
protected under the FLSA, ERISA, or any number of other statutes 
that prohibit employer retaliation but lack comparable assistance 
language. 
For example, one federal court held prior to Kasten that the 
FLSA’s antiretaliation provision protected an employee who 
circulated a petition requesting assistance to stop an alleged FLSA 
 
217 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006). 
218 Owens v. Rush, 654 F.2d 1370, 1379 (10th Cir. 1981). 
219 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). 
220 See infra Appendix. 
221 The FMLA protects an individual who “has given, or is about to give, any 
information in connection with any inquiry or proceeding relating to any right provided 
under this subchapter.”  29 U.S.C. § 2615(b)(2).  This language might cover various forms 
of “assistance.”  However, as explained infra, other forms of assistance might not be 
covered. 
222 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (FLSA); 29 U.S.C. § 2615(b)(2) (FMLA); 29 U.S.C. § 1140 
(ERISA). 
223 EEOC v. Bojangles Rests., Inc., 284 F. Supp. 2d 320, 329 (M.D.N.C. 2003). 
224 Owens v. Rush, 654 F.2d 1370, 1379 (10th Cir. 1981). 
225 See Long, supra note 69, at 987 (arguing that providing moral support to an 
individual pursuing a discrimination charge should qualify as assisting “in any manner”). 
226 See Bojangles Rests., 284 F. Supp. 2d at 329 (noting the expansive nature of this 
phrase). 
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overtime violation.227  Such conduct might conceivably amount to the 
filing of a complaint under Kasten, but it would not be an easy 
argument to make.  Instead, what the employee was expressly doing 
was requesting assistance.  But what if a coworker had taken the 
employee up on his request?  Would the coworker be protected under 
the FLSA?  The coworker’s actions might be viewed as a form of 
opposition under Crawford’s reasoning, but opposition is not a 
protected form of conduct under the FLSA.  Even if opposition is 
protected under a statute, assisting a coworker would probably not 
amount to opposition unless, at a minimum, the employer was aware 
of the assistance.228  And it would be quite a stretch to conclude that 
an employee who comes to the aid of a coworker has filed a 
complaint.  Thus, the likely result in such a case is that the employer 
would be free to retaliate against the assisting coworker. 
Other forms of coworker assistance may be left unprotected by       
§ 704(a) of Title VII.  For example, an employee who is considering 
filing an internal complaint of a supervisor’s discrimination might 
want to gather as much information as possible about the supervisor’s 
actions.  A coworker who provides the employee with information 
about other instances of discriminatory conduct on the part of the 
supervisor may have “assisted” the employee or “given information” 
to the employee.  But, as discussed above, the coworker has not 
assisted or given information in connection with a formal proceeding, 
so the coworker’s actions would probably not be protected under       
§ 704(a)’s participation clause.229  Unless the coworker’s assistance 
was open and obvious to the employer, it probably would not qualify 
as opposition conduct under Title VII.230  For the same reasons, it is 
unlikely that the assisting coworker would be protected under most 
other federal statutes. 
III 
THE ACCIDENT OF TEXT 
As Part II illustrates, the law regarding employment retaliation is 
complicated.  Nearly every statute employs different language, 
forcing the parties, their lawyers, and the courts to engage in 
 
227 Legutko v. Local 816, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 606 F. Supp. 352 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), 
aff’d on other grounds, 853 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1988). 
228 See supra notes 166–67 and accompanying text. 
229 See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
230 See supra notes 165–170 and accompanying text. 
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sometimes difficult undertakings to discern their meanings.  But more 
importantly, the law regarding employment retaliation is 
unnecessarily complicated. 
Inconsistency abounds with respect to protection from retaliation in 
federal statutes regulating the workplace.231  To provide just one 
more example, consider the interplay of several federal safety statutes 
as compared to Title VII.  As discussed, the employee who provides 
information in a neutral manner internally to an employer about a 
violation of Title VII is not protected from retaliation, but the 
employee who is more adversarial in providing the information is 
protected, unless it is part of the employee’s job to provide this kind 
of information.232  Turning to the safety statutes, the employee who, 
in a neutral manner, provides information to the employer about a 
violation of the Toxic Substances Control Act233 (an act that deals 
with, among other things, the disposal of asbestos) or the Asbestos 
School Hazard Detection and Control Act234 is probably not protected 
from retaliation because those statutes explicitly protect only those 
who make an external report about a violation or participate in formal 
governmental proceedings.  However, an employee who provides 
information in a neutral manner internally to the employer about a 
violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act is protected 
from retaliation, even if it is part of the employee’s job to provide the 
information.235 
If there is logic here, it is difficult to see.  One might attempt to 
justify the different outcomes under Title VII and the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act by arguing that those who provide 
 
231 See Richard R. Carlson, Citizen Employees, 70 LA. L. REV. 237, 243 (2009) 
(“[W]hile the number and variety of laws protecting citizen employees seems impressive, 
these laws form an incomplete, inconsistent, and unreliable patchwork.”); Christopher 
Wiener, Note, Blowing the Whistle on Van Asdale: Analysis and Recommendations, 62 
HASTINGS L.J. 531, 537 (2010) (“In effect, Congress has enacted whistleblower 
protections on a somewhat ad hoc basis as it has considered various regulatory schemes.”); 
Trystan Phifer O’Leary, Note, Silencing the Whistleblower: The Gap Between Federal and 
State Retaliatory Discharge Laws, 85 IOWA L. REV. 663, 670–71 (2000) (noting the 
tendency of some federal statutes to provide insufficient protection from retaliation).  See 
generally Orly Lobel, Lawyering Loyalties: Speech Rights and Duties Within Twenty-
First-Century New Governance, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1245, 1249 (2009) (noting 
whistleblower protection at the state and federal law level and concluding that 
“whistleblower protections have developed as a patchwork and, as a consequence, vary 
significantly in their scope and application”). 
232 See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
233 15 U.S.C. § 2622(a) (2006). 
234 20 U.S.C. § 3608 (2006). 
235 21 U.S.C.A. § 399d(a) (West 2011). 
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information to an employer about a violation of the law that poses a 
serious risk to public health or safety should be entitled to greater 
protection than others who provide information about other types of 
violations of the law, such as discrimination.  But if the primary 
concern is in bringing to the employer’s attention threats to safety and 
health, why is the employee whose job requires the reporting of 
violations of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act entitled to protection 
but the employee whose job it is to report violations of an employer’s 
illegal disposal of asbestos likely not entitled to the same protection 
under the Toxic Substances Control Act and Asbestos School Hazard 
Detection and Control Act? 
And, to be clear, this is not an isolated instance of inconsistency.  
Randomness pervades the federal approach to employer retaliation.  
In Burlington Northern, the Court emphasized that one of the 
purposes of Title VII’s antiretaliation provision—to prevent harm to 
individuals based on their protected activity—could not be achieved 
“by focusing only upon employer actions and harm that concern 
employment and the workplace.”236  Thus, to be effective, an 
antiretaliation provision must also reach nonemployment-related 
retaliation.  Surely that principle should apply to any antiretaliation 
provision.  Yet, the antiretaliation provisions of numerous federal 
statutes, by their terms, would seem to be limited to employment-
related actions, whereas others provide greater protection.237  As 
importantly, there seems to be no unifying theme that would explain 
why the language varies; some safety statutes, by their terms, are 
seemingly limited to employment-related forms of retaliation, 
whereas others provide more expansive protection from retaliation.238 
In some instances, courts have justified their strict reading of 
antiretaliation provisions by speculating as to why Congress might 
have inserted or omitted a particular word or phrase that results in an 
employee being denied a remedy in the case of employer retaliation.  
 
236 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006). 
237 See supra notes 125–128 and accompanying text. 
238 Compare Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(1) (2006) 
(prohibiting employers from discharging “or in any manner” discriminating against an 
individual who engages in protected activity), with Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 2622(a) (prohibiting employers “from discharg[ing] any employee or otherwise 
discriminat[ing] against any employee with respect to the employee’s compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment”); see also Richard Moberly, Protecting 
Whistleblowers by Contract, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 975, 982 (2008) (noting that the federal 
antiretaliation “statutory framework results in a network of narrow protections that 
evolved on an ad hoc basis to support specific statutory schemes”). 
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But the most that can usually be said for these supposed rationales is 
that they provide judges with a means of rebutting any potential 
argument that a literal reading of the statutory language leads to an 
absurd result.  Rarely are the explanations persuasive.239  For 
example, prior to Thompson, some lower courts offered two possible 
explanations for why Congress might have consciously chosen not to 
protect the victims of third-party retaliation.  First, given Title VII’s 
protection for those who provide assistance “in any manner” to one 
who has filed a complaint, Congress might have assumed that these 
victims might already be covered under this provision; therefore, 
there was no need for a separate provision prohibiting third-party 
retaliation.240  Whatever force this argument may have carried with 
respect to Title VII, it carries absolutely no weight with respect to a 
statute that does not provide protection to one who provides 
assistance to another, and it has only limited application to a statute 
lacking the “in any manner” language.  Second, lower courts have 
suggested that Congress may have been concerned about the potential 
for virtually unlimited liability if one could claim protection from 
retaliation simply because a coworker engaged in protected activity, 
thereby interfering with an employer’s ability to fire an employee at 
will.241  This is certainly a possible explanation.  But it isn’t at all 
likely, if for no other reason than that a jury is unlikely to believe that 
an employer fired a virtual stranger in order to retaliate against an 
employee who engaged in protected activity.  Instead, the most likely 
reason for the lack of any explicit protection for the victims of third-
party retaliation is that Congress simply failed to consider the 
possibility. 
There have been numerous theories advanced in an attempt to 
explain the purpose of antiretaliation provisions.  The Supreme Court 
has emphasized that one benefit of protecting employees who provide 
information to an employer about a possible violation of a law 
regulating the workplace is that it encourages informal internal 
dispute resolution.242  The Court has repeatedly emphasized the 
desirability of allowing employers to address potential violations of 
the law internally instead of promoting the more expensive, time-
 
239 See Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 569 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(acknowledging that proffered justifications were not “particularly convincing”). 
240 See Holt v. JTM Indus., Inc., 89 F.3d 1224, 1227 (5th Cir. 1996). 
241 E.g., Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 570. 
242 Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1334 (2011). 
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consuming, and adversarial route of agency enforcement.243  The 
Court’s justification has the benefit of being consistent with human 
behavior.  In general, employees prefer to voice their concerns over 
suspected misconduct internally rather than going outside the confines 
of the employer’s organization to law-enforcement authorities.244  
Employees who report wrongdoing often do so not in a 
confrontational manner but out of a sense of loyalty or duty to the 
employer.245  Thus, to the extent antiretaliation provisions are 
premised on the desire to encourage the most efficient means of 
uncovering and addressing wrongdoing,246 they should protect not 
just those who oppose or complain internally about unlawful conduct, 
but those who simply provide, in a nonadversarial manner, 
information about illegal behavior to the employer. 
The Court has also emphasized the important role that 
antiretaliation provisions play in furthering the substantive goals of 
the relevant statutory scheme.  As Richard Moberly has argued, it 
seems clear that the Court views protection from retaliation as 
essential to furthering the enforcement of law designed to benefit the 
public at large.247  In Kasten, for example, the Court emphasized that 
limiting protection from retaliation to situations in which an employee 
filed a written complaint with an employer would undermine 
Congress’s goal of protecting worker safety when it enacted the Fair 
Labor Standards Act.248 
Yet to the extent federal law seeks to promote these values, it does 
so in an inconsistent fashion.  No unifying theory can explain the 
patchwork of federal statutory antiretaliation provisions.  If, for 
example, robust protection from employer retaliation is essential to 
furthering Congress’s law-enforcement goals, there should be across-
the-board protection for employees who are the victims of third-party 
retaliation.  Instead, Congress provided a statutory remedy to some 
“aggrieved” persons but not to others.  If internal reporting of safety 
 
243 Id.; see also Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
244 See Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model to Encourage 
Corporate Whistleblowers, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1107, 1142 (noting the tendency of 
whistleblowers to report internally). 
245 Id. at 1143 (noting that employees’ sense of loyalty often prevents them from 
blowing the whistle externally). 
246 See Moberly, supra note 1, at 380 (stating that Supreme Court retaliation decisions 
are premised upon, inter alia, the assumption that “employees are in the best position to 
know about illegal conduct”). 
247 Id. 
248 Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1333 (2011). 
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violations is an important aspect of promoting public safety, those 
who raise concerns with their employer about such safety violations 
should be protected from retaliation.  Yet protection for those who 
raise internal concerns about safety hazards is spotty.  If employees 
need assurance that they will not be retaliated against for bringing 
wrongdoing to light, then all antiretaliation provisions should include 
protection from anticipatory retaliation.  Yet, while some do, most do 
not. 
To its credit, the Court may have attempted to impose some order 
upon the statutory mishmash.  But the reality is that the statutory 
framework allows for disparate treatment of similarly situated 
individuals, and this disparate treatment undermines the purposes of 
affording protection from retaliation.  And unlike in other situations, 
it is virtually impossible to ascribe logic to the existing patchwork of 
protection.  The Supreme Court was heavily criticized for its highly 
restrictive interpretations of the ADA—interpretations that appeared 
inconsistent with what seemed to be the purposes of the Act.249  But 
at least in the ADA context, it was possible to articulate some 
argument for why Congress might have wanted to make it more 
difficult for individuals with physical or mental impairments to state a 
discrimination claim than other individuals.250  The same cannot be 
said for the disparity of treatment of retaliation plaintiffs.  No 
unifying theory can explain why an employee who is fired because 
his spouse filed a claim of race discrimination against the employer is 
entitled to a remedy but an employee who is fired because his spouse 
filed a complaint alleging a violation of consumer fraud laws is not. 
 
249 See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
250 In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., the Court interpreted the ADA so as to limit the 
number of individuals who could claim disability status under the Act.  See 527 U.S. 471 
(1999).  In Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, the Court concluded 
that the terms within the ADA’s definition of disability must be “interpreted strictly to 
create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled.”  534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002).  
Samuel R. Bagenstos has argued that the Supreme Court’s restrictive readings of the 
ADA’s definition of disability are less troubling if the purpose of the ADA is viewed more 
as a form of welfare reform, designed to get individuals with disabilities off of disability 
benefit rolls and into the workforce, than as a civil rights statute.  Samuel R. Bagenstos, 
The Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921, 
976–78 (2003).  Similarly, others have argued that the fact that the ADA imposes costs on 
employers in the form of workplace alterations and other types of accommodations 
designed to allow individuals with disabilities to perform the essential functions of their 
jobs helps explain the Court’s narrow reading of the definition of disability.  See Samuel 
Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination with a Difference: Can Employment 
Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 
307, 336–37 (2001) (discussing this theory). 
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This problem is not confined to workplace retaliation claims.  
Federal employment discrimination law is also filled with a host of 
conflicting standards.251  Judges, juries, the parties, and their lawyers 
must navigate their way through a maze of proof structures and 
causation standards that vary depending upon the type of evidence of 
discriminatory intent a plaintiff possesses, what the plaintiff’s 
allegations are with respect to the defendant’s motive, and whether 
the plaintiff is alleging discrimination on the basis of age, disability, 
race, or some other protected characteristic.252  The current state of 
the law is, to put it mildly, confusing.  But what is especially 
remarkable about the complex framework for analyzing 
discrimination claims is how unnecessarily complex it all is.  As 
Professor Sandra Sperino has observed, “there is nothing especially 
complex about employment discrimination law that suggests it should 
work differently than other kinds of cases,”253 a fact confirmed by the 
reality that many of the elaborate frameworks that have been 
constructed and deconstructed ad nauseam are abandoned when a 
case actually reaches trial.254 
But the problem of conflicting statutory and judicial standards is 
exacerbated in the case of antiretaliation provisions just given the 
sheer number of such provisions in the U.S. Code.  Reading a 
representative sample, one is left with the firm conclusion that the 
landscape of federal antiretaliation provisions is the way it is because 
 
251 See William R. Corbett, Babbling About Employment Discrimination Law: Does the 
Master Builder Understand the Blueprint for the Great Tower?, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 683, 
690–91 (2010) (noting the current complexity in employment discrimination law); Martin 
J. Katz, Gross Disunity, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 857, 858 (2010) (noting the Court’s shift 
away from interpreting discrimination statutes to bring about uniformity); Sandra F. 
Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69, 75 (2011) (noting the 
complexity in disparate treatment and disparate impact law).  See generally Jeffrey M. 
Hirsch, The Law of Termination: Doing More with Less, 68 MD. L. REV. 89, 89 (2008) 
(“The laws and regulations governing the American workplace reveal a level of 
complexity and uncertainty that rivals virtually any other area of law.”). 
252 See Catherine T. Struve, Shifting Burdens: Discrimination Law Through the Lens of 
Jury Instructions, 51 B.C. L. REV. 279, 315–19 (2010) (discussing the possible application 
of burden-shifting schemes depending upon the type of discrimination alleged); see also 
Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that 
mixed-motives proof structure available in Title VII cases is not available in ADA cases).  
A similar issue may arise in retaliation cases given the fact that different statutes employ 
different causation standards.  See generally Katz, supra note 251, at 860–62 (noting the 
different causation standards employed in federal law). 
253 Sperino, supra note 251, at 118. 
254 Id. at 120–21. 
LONG 1/31/2012  1:39 PM 
2011] Employment Retaliation and the Accident of Text 575 
of inattentive drafting on the part of Congress.255  Ultimately, 
whether a retaliation plaintiff wins or loses is more likely to be the 
result of an accident of text than it is part of a coherent legislative 
scheme or purpose.256 
Retaliation victims may sometimes avoid some of the pitfalls of 
unfriendly statutory text through creative pleading.257  In other 
instances, they might encounter judges who are willing to look to the 
purposes underlying antiretaliation provisions and overlook what 
appears to be the obvious meaning of statutory language.258  But there 
are costs to these approaches, just as there are costs resulting from the 
current level of complexity in the area.  And even if my conclusions 
about the likely outcomes of some of the interpretive issues included 
in this Article prove to be incorrect, the costs that accrue in the 
interim are significant.  These costs include the expenditure of 
resources by parties in an attempt to understand the law and predict 
the outcome of future behavior and litigation.  There are also costs to 
the judiciary in terms of the expenditure of judicial resources in an 
attempt to reconcile the conflicting standards.259  There is also a cost 
in terms of the loss of judicial credibility as courts attempt to offer 
plausible explanations for the differing outcomes in these cases.260  
And if I am correct in my predictions, the most significant cost to the 
current statutory framework is the inability of retaliation law to carry 
out its purposes.  All too often the result may be that individuals 
who—under virtually any conception of the purpose of antiretaliation 
laws—should be protected from retaliation will go unprotected, while 
 
255 Professor Jeff Hirsch has argued that the same problem exists with regard to the 
rules governing termination of the employment relationship.  See Hirsch, supra note 251, 
at 90 (stating that the termination rules governing the workplace “have developed over 
time, with little to no attention focused on the regulatory structure as a whole”). 
256 See generally Carlson, supra note 231, at 243 (“A citizen employee’s protection 
against retaliation and interference depends as much on the luck of geography, occupation, 
and the law the employer violated as on the merits of the employee’s conduct or the value 
of his action to the community.”). 
257 See Long, supra note 69, at 988–89 (discussing how victims of third-party 
retaliation might prevail). 
258 See supra note 77 and accompanying text (noting that some courts prior to 
Thompson had permitted claims of third-party retaliation despite statutory language). 
259 See Hirsch, supra note 251, at 96. 
260 See Jack L. Landau, Some Observations About Statutory Construction in Oregon, 32 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 10 n.30 (1996) (“Reliance on interpretive fictions . . . undermines 
the credibility of the judicial decision-making process, particularly when the fictions are at 
odds with the realities of ordinary experience.”); see also Corbett, supra note 251, at 691 
(arguing in favor of symmetry in employment discrimination law because “the laws should 
be perceived by the public to be sensible and fair”). 
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their counterparts who are fortunate enough to be able to sue under a 
different statute are able to state a claim. 
IV 
THE NEED FOR A UNIFORM STANDARD 
Stated simply, the use of multiple antiretaliation standards 
consisting of language seemingly adopted in a haphazard manner 
produces more costs than it does benefits.  The solution to the 
problem is actually quite simple.  Congress could, with relative ease, 
adopt one antiretaliation provision that would apply to virtually all 
forms of employer retaliation. 
When a particular federal statute raises special concerns, Congress 
could specify that the model antiretaliation provision would not apply.  
For example, there is voluminous decisional law under the National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA)261 dealing with employer retaliation.262  
Imposing a new standard for employer retaliation in this setting might 
add unnecessary confusion.  Thus, NLRA retaliation cases might be 
exempted.  Perhaps statutes implicating national security might be 
exempted.  But absent some compelling reason why a federal statute 
should employ its own unique retaliation standard, all federal statutes 
regulating the workplace that currently contain antiretaliation 
provisions should be subject to one unifying standard. 
Any standard should promote the policy values underlying 
antiretaliation provisions that the Court has already identified.  These 
include the desirability of encouraging internal resolution of disputes 
and possible violations of law, preserving employee access to the 
statutory mechanisms designed to deal with possible violations of the 
substantive law, and ensuring employer compliance with the 
applicable statute’s substantive provisions.  In order to promote 
consistency, any standard should also incorporate any existing 
 
261 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006). 
262 Of course, retaliation against employees for exercising their rights under federal 
labor law has its own set of problems.  See Benjamin I. Sachs, Enabling Employee Choice: 
A Structural Approach to the Rules of Union Organizing, 123 HARV. L. REV. 655, 681 
(2010) (“[W]orkers bear a substantial risk of losing their jobs should they support a 
unionization effort, and among those union supporters who are not discharged or formally 
disciplined for their activity, many face softer forms of retaliation that are nonetheless 
quite significant and can diminish career prospects.”); see also Michael H. Gottesman, In 
Despair, Starting Over: Imagining a Labor Law for Unorganized Workers, 69 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 59, 62 (1993) (arguing that the main reason employees do not unionize is fear of 
employer retaliation and that “[t]he NLRA does not protect workers meaningfully against 
employer reprisal for attempts to unionize”). 
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Supreme Court holdings that clarify the scope of an employee’s 
entitlement to protection from retaliation. 
While the exact language of such a provision can be left to the 
drafters, any antiretaliation measure should protect employees when 
retaliation occurs in any of the following situations: 
 (1) Because the individual has provided information to the 
employer, law enforcement, or government official about a 
violation of federal law applicable to the workplace that the 
employee reasonably believes has occurred, is occurring, or is about 
to occur, including when it is part of the employee’s job to provide 
such information. 
 (2) Because the individual has opposed, in a reasonable 
manner, a violation of law that the employee reasonably believes 
has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur. 
 (3) Because the individual has made a charge, testified, 
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, 
proceeding, or hearing under the relevant statute. 
 (4) Because the individual has assisted another in any of these 
actions. 
 (5) Because the employer believes the individual has done any 
of the above or may do any of the above. 
 (6) Because of the individual’s association with an individual 
described in (1)–(5) above. 
In addition, protection should not be limited to instances involving 
retaliation occurring in the workplace.  In keeping with the Court’s 
holding in Burlington Northern, retaliation should be prohibited when 
it is materially adverse (that is, when it might dissuade a reasonable 
employee from engaging in the protected conduct).263 
There are few downsides to this approach.  The adoption of one 
unifying antiretaliation provision would provide employers and 
employees with a better ability to predict the future consequences of a 
particular act, and it would reduce the need for the parties and judges 
to devote substantial resources to trying to distinguish and reconcile 
the conflicting standards that presently apply.  Admittedly, more 
employees who are unable to recover under existing law would be 
able to recover under the proposed standard.  However, employer 
concerns over the possibility of increased litigation and liability are 
somewhat muted by at least two realities. 
 
263 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006). 
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First, the benefits of predictability should somewhat offset some of 
these increased costs.  In 2008, Congress amended the ADA’s 
definition of disability.264  The new definition is far more expansive 
and should make it significantly easier for plaintiffs to establish the 
existence of a disability and thereby potentially claim entitlement to 
protection under the statute.265  Congress accomplished this result 
with cooperation from business interests.266  At the time, however, 
employers were obtaining a significant benefit from the existing 
definition of disability, as evidenced by the fact that employers were 
consistently winning the overwhelming majority of disability 
discrimination cases.267  Thus, employers seemingly had little 
incentive to go along with any change that would make it easier for 
plaintiffs to claim protection.  Yet go along they did.  While business 
interests may have seen the writing on the wall with regard to an 
amended definition of disability after the election of a Democratic 
Congress around that time, it is also entirely possible that business 
interests recognized the value of greater predictability.  According to 
the legislative history of the ADA Amendments Act, the relevant 
stakeholders recognized the need for a framework that would be 
“more predictable, consistent, and workable for all entities subject to 
responsibilities under the ADA.”268  The new definition of disability 
provides greater clarity in many respects,269 thus limiting the 
potential for costly disagreements, ex and post ante, as to coverage. 
Second, in order to prevail, an employee still must establish a 
causal connection between the employer action and the protected 
employee activity.270  This is not always an easy task.  A substantial 
delay between employee action and employer response may make it 
difficult for the employee to establish a connection.271  Similarly, 
jurors may find it difficult to believe there was a causal connection in 
 
264 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 (West 2011)). 
265 Sharona Hoffman, The Importance of Immutability in Employment Discrimination 
Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1483, 1493 (2011). 
266 See David G. Savage, Job Discrimination Bill to Widen Who’s Covered, L.A. TIMES, 
Sept. 8, 2008, at 13 (noting the support of the Chamber of Commerce). 
267 See Sharona Hoffman, Settling the Matter: Does Title I of the ADA Work?, 59 ALA. 
L. REV. 305, 308–09 (2008) (discussing plaintiffs’ “extremely low win rates under Title I 
of the ADA”). 
268 154 Cong. Rec. 19,098 (2008) (Manager’s Statement). 
269 Hoffman, supra note 265, at 1493. 
270 Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 272 (2001). 
271 See id. at 273–74 (concluding that causation was not established when there was a 
twenty-month gap between the protected activity and the adverse employer’s action). 
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some instances.  For example, while employers have expressed 
concern about the scope of the Court’s holding in Thompson that the 
victims of third-party retaliation have a remedy under Title VII, the 
reality is that it will be difficult for a plaintiff to convince a jury that 
an employer retaliated against the employee for the employee’s 
protected conduct by firing a coworker unless there was some type of 
close connection between the employee and the coworker.  Likewise, 
the human resources manager whose job it is to inform management 
of possible violations of law may have a difficult time convincing a 
jury that she was fired for doing her job rather than for some other 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.  Ultimately, the causation 
element of a retaliation claim serves to limit an employer’s potential 
liability. 
CONCLUSION 
A majority of the Supreme Court may take an expansive view of 
the role of antiretaliation provisions. But the Court has also 
established a practice of focusing first and foremost on the text of 
statutory antiretaliation provisions.  It is only after the Court can 
plausibly assert that the text permits a particular reading that the 
Court is willing to discuss the functional considerations supporting 
that interpretation.  Therefore, despite the success that retaliation 
plaintiffs have enjoyed before the Court in recent years, future 
retaliation plaintiffs are unlikely to prevail if the statutory language 
strongly suggests a contrary outcome. 
The reality is that there are many federal antiretaliation 
provisions—some contained in prominent statutes, others in lesser-
known statutes—that contain potentially strong obstacles to an 
expansive interpretation.  And while there may be a unifying 
interpretive principle underlying the Supreme Court’s retaliation 
jurisprudence, there is no unifying principle underlying the statutory 
antiretaliation framework at the federal level.  The statutory language 
in many instances seems to have been borrowed from other sources in 
some instances and created sua sponte in others, with no apparent 
rhyme or reason.  The result is that similarly situated victims of 
retaliation are likely to be treated differently due to the accident of 
text.  In order to address the costs resulting from the current state of 
affairs, Congress should adopt a single antiretaliation provision that 
would apply to all federal statutes that currently contain workplace 
retaliation provisions. 
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APPENDIX 
 Retaliation 
prohibition linked 
to compensation, 
terms, conditions, 
or privileges of 
employment? 
Contains an 
opposition 
clause? 
Express 
protection for 
providing 
information 
about 
unlawful 
conduct to 
employer? 
Express 
protection for 
providing 
information 
about 
unlawful 
conduct to 
employer as 
part of job? 
Express 
protection 
from 
anticipatory 
retaliation? 
Express 
requirement 
of good-faith, 
reasonable 
belief of 
unlawful 
conduct when 
filing a 
formal 
complaint? 
Express 
protection for 
participating 
“in any 
manner” in a 
proceeding? 
Express 
protection for 
providing 
assistance? 
Title VII, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-
3(a) 
No Yes No No No No Yes Yes 
ADEA, 29 
U.S.C. § 623(d) No Yes No No No No Yes Yes 
ADA, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12203(a) & (b) No Yes No No No No Yes Yes 
FLSA, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 215(a)(3) No No No No 
Yes (for 
testifying in 
connection 
with a 
proceeding 
or serving on 
an industry 
committee; 
no for other 
activities) 
No No No 
FMLA, 29 
U.S.C. § 2615 No Yes No No 
Yes (for 
giving 
information 
or testifying 
in connection 
with a 
proceeding; 
no for filing 
a charge) 
No No No 
ERISA, 29 
U.S.C. § 1140 No No No No 
Yes (for 
giving 
information 
or testifying 
in connection 
with a 
proceeding; 
no for other 
activities) 
No No No 
OSHA,  29 
U.S.C. § 660 No No* No No 
Yes (for 
testifying in 
connection 
with a 
proceeding; 
no for other 
activities) 
No No 
Yes (exercise 
of rights on 
behalf of 
others) 
Asbestos School 
Hazard 
Detection and 
Control Act, 20 
U.S.C. § 3608 
Yes No No No No No No No 
Surface 
Transportation 
Assistance Act 
of 1982, 49 
U.S.C. § 31105 
Yes 
Yes (refusal 
to perform 
task) 
No No Yes No No Yes 
Migrant and 
Seasonal 
Agricultural 
Worker 
Protection Act, 
29 U.S.C.  
§ 1855(a); id. 
§ 1854(a) 
No No No No No Yes (“with just cause”) No Yes 
Immigration 
Reform and 
Control Act, 8 
U.S.C.  
§ 1324b(a)(5) 
No No No No Yes No Yes No 
Federal Credit 
Union Act, 12 
U.S.C. 
§ 1790b(a) 
(employees of 
credit unions) 
Yes No No No No No No Yes 
Consumer 
Product Safety 
Act, 15 U.S.C.  
§ 2087 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Toxic 
Substances 
Control Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 2622 
Yes No No No Yes No Yes Yes 
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 Retaliation 
prohibition 
linked to 
compensation, 
terms, 
conditions, or 
privileges of 
employment? 
Contains an 
opposition 
clause? 
Express 
protection for 
providing 
information 
about 
unlawful 
conduct to 
employer? 
Express 
protection for 
providing 
information 
about 
unlawful 
conduct to 
employer as 
part of job? 
Express 
protection 
from 
anticipatory 
retaliation? 
Express 
requirement of 
good-faith, 
reasonable 
belief of 
unlawful 
conduct when 
filing a formal 
complaint? 
Express 
protection for 
participating “in 
any manner” in 
a proceeding? 
Express 
protection for 
providing 
assistance? 
Wendell H. Ford 
Aviation 
Investment and 
Reform Act for 
the 21st Century 
(AIR 21), 49 
U.S.C. § 42121 
Yes No Yes No Yes No No Yes 
Federal Food, 
Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act, 21 
U.S.C. § 399d 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
Asbestos Hazard 
Emergency 
Response Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 2651 
No No 
Yes, (for 
providing 
information 
“to any other 
person”) 
No No No No No 
The Federal Mine 
Safety and Health 
Act of 1977, 30 
U.S.C. § 815 
No No Yes No No No No 
Yes 
(exercising 
rights on 
behalf of 
another) 
Energy 
Reorganization 
Act (ERA), 42 
U.S.C. § 5851 
Yes 
Yes (refused 
to engage in 
action) 
Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 
Pipeline Safety 
Improvement Act 
(PSIA), 49 U.S.C. 
§ 60129 
Yes 
Yes (refused 
to engage in 
action) 
Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 
Clean Air Act 
(CAA), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7622 
Yes No No No No No Yes Yes 
Safe Drinking 
Water Act 
(SDWA), 42 
U.S.C. § 300j-9 
Yes No No No Yes No Yes Yes 
Comprehensive 
Environmental 
Response, 
Compensation, 
and Liability Act 
(CERCLA), 42 
U.S.C. § 9610 
No No No No 
Yes (but only 
for testifying, 
not filing a 
complaint) 
No No No 
Federal Water 
Pollution 
Prevention and 
Control Act 
(FWPPCA), 33 
U.S.C. § 1367 
No No No No No No No No 
Solid Waste 
Disposal Act 
(SWDA), 42 
U.S.C § 6971 
No No Yes No 
Yes (but only 
for testifying, 
not filing a 
complaint) 
No No No 
Uniformed 
Services 
Employment and 
Reemployment 
Rights Act of 
1994 (USERRA), 
38 U.S.C. § 4311 
Yes (“any 
adverse 
employment 
action”) 
No No No No No No Yes 
* Indicates the existence of Supreme Court precedent suggesting a different outcome. 
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